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The Carleton UniversityStudent Journal of Philosophy |
1998
The Carleton University Student Journal of Philosophy
Contents
Although Sartre and Nietzsche have been grouped together
as atheistic existentialists, the idea that there are significant parallels
between them is by no means common. While Sartre has frequently been portrayed
as a derivative and syncretic thinker, it is the ideas of Descartes, Hegel,
Husserl, and Heidegger which he discusses, develops, and criticizes in
Being and Nothingness. While major continental thinkers like Heidegger,
Jaspers, Deleuze, and Derrida each wrote a book about Nietzsche and were
greatly influenced by his thought, Sartre virtually ignores Nietzsche and
refers to him only twice in Being and Nothingness. However, the
question of influence is one thing and that of intellectual parallels is
another. In the history of ideas it is not uncommon for thinkers to independently
arrive at the similar positions - especially if they are addressing similar
problems and living in similar times. Unfortunately, when a philosopher
like Sartre neglects the thought of a predecessor working in the same domain,
he may unknowingly follow some of the very same paths and he runs the risk
of stumbling into pitfalls that his predecessor shows us how to avoid.
To begin with, there are some obvious general parallels
between Nietzsche and Sartre which few commentators would wish to dispute.
Both are vehement atheists who resolutely face up to the fact that the
cosmos has no inherent meaning or purpose. Unlike several other thinkers,
they do not even try to replace the dead God of Christian theology with
talk of Absolute Spirit or Being. In one of only two brief references to
Nietzsche in Being and Nothingness, Sartre upholds his rejection
of "the illusion of worlds-behind-the-scene;" that is, the notion that
there is a Platonic true world of noumenal being which stands behind becoming
and reduces phenomena to the status of mere illusion or appearance. 1
Both thinkers also insist that it is human beings who create moral values
and attempt to give meaning to life. Sartre speaks ironically of the "serious"
men who think that values have an absolute objective existence, while Nietzsche
regards people who passively accept the values they have been taught as
sheep-like members of the herd.
When we attempt a deeper explanation of the ultimate
source of values, the relationship between Sartre and Nietzsche becomes
more problematic. Nietzsche says that out of a nation (or person's) tablet
of good and evil speaks "the voice of their will to power". 2
For Sartre, the values that we adopt or posit are part of our fundamental
project, which is to achieve justified being and become in-itself-for-itself.
It appears, therefore, that both thinkers regard man as an essentially
Faustian striver, and that it would not be unfair to group Sartre with
Nietzsche as a proponent of "will to power".
Clearly, Sartre would object to such a Nietzschean
characterization of his existential psychoanalysis. In Being and Nothingness
he rejects all theories which attempt to explain individual behaviour in
terms of general substantive drives, and he is particularly critical of
such notions as the libido and the will to power. Sartre insists that these
are not irreducible psycho-biological entities, but original projects like
any other which the individual can negate through his or her freedom. He
denies that striving for power is a general characteristic of human beings,
denies the existence of any opaque and permanent will-entity within consciousness,
and even denies that human beings have any fixed nature or essence.
Similarities: Sartre as a Proponent of
'Will to Power'
However, Sartre's criticisms of the will to power
are only applicable to popular misunderstandings of Nietzsche's thought.
Like the for-itself, Nietzsche's "will" should not be regarded as a substantive
entity. Although it is derived from the metaphysical theories of Schopenhauer
and is sometimes spoken of in ways which invite ontologizing, Nietzsche's
conception of the will is predominantly adjectival and phenomenological.
Its status is similar to that of Sartre's for-itself, which should not
be considered a metaphysical entity even though it is a remote descendent
of the "thinking substance" of Descartes. Thus, in Beyond Good and Evil
Nietzsche criticizes the unjustified metaphysical assumptions which are
bound up with the Cartesian "I think" and the Schopenhauerian "I will".3
He says that "willing seems to me to be above all something complicated,
something that is a unity only as a word". 4
Although there are passages in the writings of both Sartre and Nietzsche
which can be interpreted metaphysically if taken out of context, it is
better to regard "nothingness" and "will" as alternate adjectival descriptions
of our being.
Although Nietzsche's use of the word "power" invites
misunderstanding, he clearly uses the term in a broad sense and has a sophisticated
conception of power. Most certainly, he is not claiming that everyone really
wants political power or dominion over other people. Nietzsche describes
philosophy as "the most spiritual will to power," 5
and regards the artist as a higher embodiment of the will to power than
either the politician or the conqueror. Through his theory Nietzsche can
account for a wide variety of human behaviour without being reductionist.
Thus, a follower may subordinate himself to a leader or group to feel empowered,
and even the perverse or negative behaviour of the ascetic priest or resentful
moralist can be accounted for in terms of the will to power.
Nietzsche speaks of "power" in reaction to the 19th
century moral theorists who insisted that men strive for utility or pleasure.
The connotations of "power" are broader and richer, suggesting that a human
being is more than a calculative "economic man" whose desires could be
satisfied with the utopian comforts of a Brave New World. Nietzsche's
meaning could also be brought out by speaking of a will to self-realization,
(one of his favourite mottoes was "Become what you are!") or by thinking
of "power" as a psychic energy or potentiality whose possession "empowers"
us to aspire, strive, and create.
In Being and Nothingness, Sartre presents
himself as the discoverer of the full scope of human freedom, contrasting
his seemingly open and indeterminate conception of human possibility with
a psychological and philosophical tradition that limits human nature by
positing "opaque" drives and goals and insisting on their universality.
Such an image of Sartre is widely held, although his insistence that consciousness
strives to become in-itself-for-itself gives his view of man a greater
determinacy than a cursory glance at some of his philosophical rhetoric
and literary works would suggest. For this reason, Sartre can profitably
be related to other theorists who argue that man is motivated by a unitary
force or strives for a single goal.
When evaluating such theories, the really essential
distinction is between those which are open, inclusive and empirically
indeterminate, and those which are narrow and reductionist. This could
be illustrated by comparing the narrow utilitarianism of Bentham to Mill's
broader development of the theory, or by contrasting Freud and Jung's conception
of the libido. While Freud was resolutely reductionist and insisted that
"the name of libido is properly reserved for the instinctual forces of
sexual life," Jung broadened the term to refer to all manifestations of
instinctual psychic energy. Thus, Sartre appears revolutionary when he
contrasts himself with Freud although he cannot legitimately claim that
his view of man is more open or less reductionist than that of Nietzsche.
Most likely, Sartre and many of his commentators
would take issue with the above conclusion, and from a certain perspective
their criticisms are justified. Unlike Nietzsche, Sartre is intent on upholding
man's absolute freedom, rejecting the influence of instinct, denying the
existence of unconscious psychic forces, and portraying consciousness as
a nothingness which has no essence. In comparison even with other non-reductionist
views of man, then, it would seem that the radical nature of Sartre's thought
is unmatched.
However, in a more fundamental respect Sartre's
ontology limits human possibility by (1) declaring that consciousness is
a lack which is doomed to vainly strive for fulfilment and justification,
and by (2) accepting important parts of the Platonic view of becoming as
ontologically given rather than merely as aspects of his own original project.
It is in this way that Sartre's philosophy becomes shipwrecked on reefs
which Nietzsche manages to avoid.
For Sartre, "the for-itself is defined ontologically
as a lack of being," and "freedom is really synonymous with lack". 6
Along with Plato he equates desire with a lack of being, but in contrast
with Hegel he arrives at the pessimistic conclusion that "human reality
therefore is by nature an unhappy consciousness with no possibility of
surpassing its unhappy state". 7
In other words, the human condition is basically Sisyphean, for man is
condemned to strive to fill his inner emptiness but is incapable of achieving
justified being. This desire to become in-self-for-itself, which Sartre
also refers to as the project of being God, is said to define man and come
"close to being the same as a human `nature' or an `essence'".8
Sartre tries to reconcile this universal project with freedom by claiming
that our wish to be in-itself-for-itself determines only the meaning of
human desire but does not constitute it empirically. However such freedom
is tainted, for no matter what we do empirically we cannot avoid futile
striving nor achieve an authentic sense of satisfaction, plenitude, joy,
or fulfilment.
In Part Four of Being and Nothingness, Sartre
describes how consciousness attempts to make up for its lack of being by
striving to appropriate and possess the world. With a somewhat reductionistic
vehemence, he explains a variety of human behaviour in terms of the insatiable
desire to consume, acquire, dominate, violate, and destroy. Sartre says
that knowledge and discovery are appropriative enjoyments, and he characterizes
the scientist as a sort of intellectual peeping Tom who wants to strip
away the veils of nature and deflower her with his Look.9
Similarly, He says that the artist wants to produce substantive being which
exists through him, and that the skier seeks to possess the field
of snow and conquer the slope. Thus art, science, and play are all activities
of appropriation, which either wholly or in part seek to possess the absolute
being of the in-itself. 10
Destruction is also an appropriative behaviour. Sartre says that "a gift
is a primitive form of destruction," describes giving as "a keen, brief
enjoyment, almost sexual," and declares that "to give is to enslave".11
He even interprets smoking as "the symbolic equivalent of destructively
appropriating the entire world".12
Aside from the sweeping and somewhat one-sided nature
of Sartre's claims, the most striking aspect of this section is the negativity
of its account of human beings. Not only are we condemned to dissatisfaction,
but some of our noblest endeavours are unmasked as pointless appropriation
and destruction. One is reminded not of Nietzsche's will to power, but
of Heidegger's scathing criticism of the "will to power" (interpreted popularly)
as the underlying metaphysics of our era which embodies all that is most
despicable about modernity. For Heidegger, it is such an insatiable will
which is embodied in our quest to subjugate nature, mechanize the world,
and enjoy ever-increasing material progress.
However, while Sartre speaks of consciousness as
nothingness or a lack - a sort of black hole in being which can never be
filled - Nietzsche associates man's being with positivity and plenitude.
His preferred metaphor for the human essence is the will - an active image
which allows striving and creativity to be reconciled with plenitude. It
enables him to see activity and desire as a positive aspect of our nature,
rather than a somewhat desperate attempt to fill the hole at the heart
of our being. For Nietzsche, all that proceeds from weakness, sickness,
inferiority, or lack is considered reactive and resentful, while that which
proceeds from health, strength, or plenitude is characterized in positive
terms. For instance, at the beginning of Thus Spoke Zarathustra he likens
Zarathustra to a full cup wanting to overflow and to the sun which gives
its light out of plenitude and superabundance.13
Later, he contrasts the generosity of the gift-giving virtue with the all-too-poor
and hungry selfishness of the sick, which greedily "sizes up those who
have much to eat" and always "sneaks around the table of those who give".14
Differences: Sartre's Failure to Overcome Platonism and Affirm the World
An even sharper contrast can be drawn between Nietzsche
and Sartre's attitudes towards Platonism. While both reject the transcendent
realm of perfect forms, Sartre fails to realize that a denial of the truth-value
of Platonic metaphysics without a corresponding rejection of Platonic asperations
and attitudes can only lead to pessimism and resentment against being.
The inadequacy and incompleteness of Sartre's break with Platonism can
be brought out by examining it in terms of William James conception of
the common nucleus of religion. James says that the religious attitude
fundamentally involves (1) "an uneasiness," or the "sense that there is
something wrong about us as we naturally stand," and (2) "its solution".15
Sartre vehemently rejects all religious and metaphysical "solutions," but
he accepts the notion that there is an essential wrongness or lack in being.
Not only does he regard consciousness as a lack, but in Nausea,
Sartre condemns the wrongness of nature and other people in terms which
are both Platonic and resentful.
Just as Plato admired the mathematical orderliness
of music and looked down upon nature as a fluctuating and imperfect copy
of the forms, the central contrast of Nausea is between the sharp,
precise, inflexible order of a jazz song, and the lack of order and purpose
of a chestnut tree. Roquentin enjoys virtually his only moments of joy
in the novel while listening to the jazz, but experiences his deepest nausea
while sitting beneath the tree. He regards its root as a "black, knotty
mass, entirely beastly,"16
speaks of the abundance of nature as "dismal, ailing, embarrassed at itself,"
and asks "what good are so many duplications of trees?".17
Nothing could be a more striking blasphemy against nature. Trees are one
of the most venerable and life-giving of all organic beings, providing
us with oxygen and shade. Many ancient peoples regarded trees as sacred,
and enlightenment (from the insight of the Buddha to Newton's discovery
of gravitation) is often pictured as coming while sitting under a tree.
Roquentin too, experiences a sort of negative epiphany while he is beneath
the chestnut tree. He concludes that "every existing thing is born without
reason, prolongs itself out of weakness and dies by chance".18
In contrast to the pointlessness of the tree and other existing organic
beings, Sartre says that a perfect circle is not absurd because "it is
clearly explained by the rotation of a straight segment around one of its
extremities".19
In such a Platonic spirit, he reflects:
If you existed, you had to exist all the way, as far as mouldiness, bloatedness, obscenity were concerned. In another world, circles, bars of music keep their pure and rigid lines.20In Nausea, Sartre reveals a contempt for human beings which surpasses his contempt for nature and even rivals the misanthropy of Schopenhauer. He particularly despises the organic, biological aspect of our nature. He speaks of living creatures as "flabby masses which move spontaneously,"21 and seems to have a particular aversion for fleshy, overweight people. He mocks at "the fat, pale crowd,"22 describes a bourgeois worthy in the Bouville gallery as "defenseless, bloated, slobbering, vaguely obscene,"23 and recalls a "terrible heat wave which turned men into pools of melting fat".24 Sartre also feels that people are somehow diminished while eating. Roquentin is glad when the Self-Taught Man is served his dinner for "his soul leaves his eyes, and he docilely begins to eat".25 Hugo thinks that Olga offers him food because "it keeps the other person at a distance," and "when a man is eating, he seems harmless".26 Sartre also takes a negative view of sensuality. Roquentin says of young lovers in a cafe that they make him a little sick, and his account of sex with the patronne includes the fact that "she disgusts me a little" and that his arm went to sleep while playing "distractedly with her sex under the cover".27 Perhaps his attitude toward sensuality is most uncharitably manifested when he thinks of a woman he had seen dining, remembers her as
"fat, hot, sensual, absurd, with red ears," and imagines her now somewhere - in the midst of smells? - this soft throat rubbing up luxuriously against smooth stuffs, nestling in lace, and the woman picturing her bosom under her blouse, thinking "My titties, my lovely fruits."28Indeed, throughout Nausea the narrator's attitude toward people is uncharitable, judgemental, and resentful. Like the somewhat hostile Other of Being and Nothingness, Roquentin transcends and objectifies other people with his Look. He sits in cafes observing and passing judgement on people, and seems to particularly enjoy dehumanizing others by focusing on their unattractive physical features. He sees one fellow as a moustache beneath "enormous nostrils that could pump air for a whole family and that eat up half his face," while another person is described as "a young man with a face like a dog".29 He treats the Self-Taught Man (whom Sartre uses to caricature humanism) coldly and condescendingly and does not even deem him worthy of a proper name. His attitude toward the eminent bourgeois portrayed in the Bouville gallery is an almost classic example of ressentiment. While looking at their portraits, he felt that their "judgement went through (him) like a sword and questioned (his) very right to exist".30 Like Hugo in Dirty Hands, he senses the emptiness of his own existence and feels inadequate and abnormal before the Look of purposeful and self-confident others who unreflectively feel that they have a right to exist. However, he manages to transcend their looks by concentrating on their bodily weaknesses and all-too-human faults. Thus, he overcomes one dead worthy by focusing on his "thin mouth of a dead snake"31 and pale, round, flabby checks, and he puts a reactionary politician in his place by recalling that the man was only five feet tall, had a squeaking voice, was accused of putting rubber lifts in his shoes, and had a wife who looked like a horse.32 Roquentin hates the bourgeois, but for him virtually all the people of Bouville are bourgeois:
Idiots. It is repugnant to me to think that I am going to see their thick, self-satisfied faces. They make laws, they write popular novels, they get married, they are fools enough to have children.33Although Sartre is more insightful than the unreflective and self-satisfied "normal" people whom he judges so uncharitably, he seems unaware that his own thought fails to escape the ancient reefs of Platonism and metaphysical pessimism. Even the upbeat ending of Nausea is somewhat tentative and half-hearted, and does not question or overturn any of the ontological views expressed earlier in the book.
Of those modern thinkers who resolutely face the
fact that God is dead and the universe contains no inherent meaning or
purpose, Sartre and Nietzsche are among the most important. However, although
they begin from somewhat similar premises, Sartre is both a less radical
and less life-affirming thinker than Nietzsche. It is particularly ironic
that he puts so much emphasis on freedom, and yet refuses to grant consciousness
the power to overcome its insatiable yearning to be in-itself-for-itself,
and fails to question his own Platonic prejudices against nature and becoming.
4 Ibid., p. 19. [Back
to text]
5 Ibid., p. 9. [Back
to text]
6 Being and Nothingness,
p. 722. [Back to text]
7 Ibid., p. 140. [Back
to text]
8 Ibid., p. 724. [Back
to text]
9 Ibid., p. 738. [Back
to text]
10 Ibid., p. 747. [Back
to text]
11 Ibid., p. 758. [Back
to text]
12 Ibid., p. 761. [Back
to text]
13 Thus Spoke Zarathustra,
Prologue:1. [Back to text]
14 Ibid., I:22. [Back
to text]
15 William James, The Varieties of
Religious Experience (New York: Viking-Penguin, 1982), p. 508.
[Back to text]
16 Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea,
trans. Lloyd Alexander (New York: New Directions, 1964), p. 127.
[Back to text]
17 Ibid., p. 133. [Back
to text]
18 Ibid. [Back
to text]
19 Ibid., p. 129. [Back
to text]
20 Ibid., p. 128. [Back
to text]
21 Ibid., p. 24. [Back
to text]
22 Ibid., p. 45. [Back
to text]
23 Ibid., p. 89. [Back
to text]
24 Ibid., p. 177. [Back
to text]
25 Ibid., p. 106. [Back
to text]
26 Ibid., p. 132. [Back
to text]
27 Ibid., p. 59.
[Back to text]
28 Ibid., p. 134. [Back
to text]
29 Ibid., p. 20. [Back
to text]
30 Ibid., p. 84. [Back
to text]
31 Ibid., p. 89. [Back
to text]
32 Ibid., p. 93. [Back
to text]
33 Ibid., p. 158. [Back
to text]
34 Thus Spoke Zarathustra, III:4. [Back to text]
35 Beyond Good and Evil, p. 6. [Back to text]
36 Thus Spoke Zarathustra, II:2. [Back to text]
37 Ibid., p. 158. [Back to text]
38 Ibid. [Back to text]
39 Ibid. [Back to text]
40 Ibid. [Back
to text]
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil. Trans. R.J. Hollingdale. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1973.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Viking, 1954.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness. Trans. Hazel Barnes. New York: Washington Square, 1956.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. Nausea. Trans. Lloyd Alexander.
New York: New Directions, 1964.