The New Russian Foreign Policy, edited by Michael Mandelbaum, Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York, 1998

          In his latest work, Michael Mandelbaum assembles a line-up of four heavy hitters to analyze the disconcerting trends emerging in Russian foreign policy and to explore possible future scenarios for Russian behaviour on the international scene. Surveying Russia’s relations with the "civilized world" and with its new neighbours to the west and south, the authors underline the shift away from the conciliatory approach of "perestroika diplomacy" in 1992 towards what they define as the harder, neoimperialist, and possibly anti-Western, strain of Russian foreign policy. Each contributor examines a particular aspect of this shift: Leon Aron looks at the changing domestic political context; Sherman Garnett explores Russia’s relations with the West in the "new borderlands" of Ukraine and the Baltic states; Rajan Menon analyzes Russia’s involvement in the Caucasus and Central Asia; and, Coit D. Blacker examines Russia’s attempts to "reconcile the irreconcilable" with the West. Taken together, the message of the book is clear: While Russia may be weak today, beware the sleeping bear.

          Mandelbaum sets the tone of the book in trademark style with his introduction detailing the history of Russian foreign policy since the fall of communism. After a brief overview of the era of "perestroika diplomacy," he argues that Russia’s "new" foreign policy line that followed the dramatic 1993 parliamentary election of communists and "nationalist xenophobes" is incompatible with the more hospitable cooperative and integrationist stance originally pursued by Yeltsin’s administration. It is clear that in the eyes of Mandelbaum, and the rest of the authors, Russian opposition to Western international objectives is undesirable. Of the scenarios that Mandelbaum paints for future courses of Russian foreign policy, he writes, "the most desirable remains integration with the West." What is interesting, however, is that "integration" is never clearly defined. Mandelbaum insists that Russia is in a position today to become more like "the rest of Europe" domestically, and that this is key for it to become a part of the West internationally. But while it is indeed important for Russia to strive towards a liberal democratic political system, and to participate constructively in European economic and security institutions, it remains unclear as to whether Russia actually should become part of the West, if this means that it must support the West in everything that it does on the international stage. Furthermore, it is questionable as to whether the West would accept Russia into the fold with open arms in the first place.

          Nevertheless, the starting point for the book is clear: What would be best for all those concerned is that Russia cooperates with the West and strives to integrate itself into the rest of Europe. From this, Mandelbaum states that the book will analyze the ‘new’ Russian foreign policy by seeking to address two fundamental questions: What are the international purposes of the new Russian state? And, where and how will it achieve them? Given that the Council on Foreign Relations, an organization that seeks to provide new ideas for U.S. foreign policy, published the book, it is not surprising that the authors tackle these questions strictly from an American perspective. It is also not surprising, then, that with the exception of Menon’s chapter on Russia and the newly independent states to its south, the book focuses almost exclusively on Russia’s relations with the West. To begin with, Aron’s piece on the domestic context argues that the rise of neoimperial political forces in Russia has caused the Yeltsin administration to take a harder line in its foreign policy towards the West. He likens the new Russian foreign policy to Gaullism, one that is suspicious of the West, and that strives to distinguish itself from, and possibly challenge U.S. hegemonic interests. However, Aron notes that Russia has refrained from antagonizing the U.S.-led West with its "calculated" opposition, and he predicts that when U.S. foreign policy positions are firmly and unambiguously communicated, such as in the cases of NATO expansion and Bosnia, then Russia is likely to concede to, or even cooperate with U.S. interests. Similarly, in his chapter, "Russia and the West in the New Borderlands," Garnett predicts a rocky future for the security zone separating NATO and Russia, given the vital interests of both Europe and Russia in the region, and that Ukraine and the Baltic states are "tilting toward the West." Like Aron, Garnett also argues that Russia is constrained in terms of its policy options, and holds that any ambitious neoimperial objectives Russia may hold towards the region can be curtailed if Russia works cooperatively with the West to "muddle through" these differences. Finally, Coit Blacker injects his own American perspective, arguing that it is a "dangerous indulgence" for Russia to demand integration into Western institutions while also insisting on preserving its independence from, and autonomy within these European organizations. While he notes that this "contingent cooperation strategy" reflects the political pressures Russian leaders face from anti-Western domestic forces, he argues that it has strained Russia’s international credibility, as well as confused and irritated the West, without whose support Russia will not be able to complete the painful process of political and economic transition. The problem, Blacker contends, is how to sustain a pro-Western integrationist foreign policy in the absence of meaningful domestic support. It is held that this pro-Western foreign policy is indispensable to the restoration of Russia’s economic health and political well being.

          However, while the U.S. policy-lens approach may be useful for those studying the implications of Russian foreign policy behaviour vis-à-vis American interests, it does not necessarily provide for a balanced and objective analysis overall. When reading the book, it is important to keep in mind that the argument that Russia can and should become like the West is typically American, and is made by those who wish to bring Russia on side with American foreign policy goals. Moreover, it is also necessary to recognize that this argument negates the possibility that it is a good thing to have a European power that constructively challenges Western international actions and hence keeps the West accountable and in check. Russia spans two continents – Europe and Asia, and all too often people assume that Russia ends at the Urals. While cooperative relations with the United States and Europe are indeed key to successful and productive Russian relations on the world stage, this approach should not preclude the formation of a distinctive identity and foreign policy that can act as a balance to Western unilateralism, as well as provide a useful link to the rising Asian powers such as China, India, and North Korea. It is clear that the authors of this book do not necessarily share this point of view. In particular, not only does Blacker’s assessment of the foreign policies conducted by Kozyrev and Primakov following the shift in Russia’s domestic political situation question the idea of Russian "national interests," but it only gives a cursory examination of Russia’s attempts to create a balance through diversifying its foreign policy interests. Russia’s relations with China and India are reduced to economics – forging closer ties with the East would "complicate, and in all likelihood retard" Russia’s economic and political recovery. Again, writing from the American point of view, Blacker inevitably discounts that it may be beneficial for the international system in its entirety to have a strong European power than can act as a distinctive ‘balancer’ for both Western and Eastern interests.

          Given the narrow lens through which this book conducts its analysis, it becomes clear as to why Mandelbaum’s The New Russian Foreign Policy is difficult to find in Canadian stores and libraries. Nevertheless, the book does provide useful insight for those studying the subject, particularly if they are doing so with American interests in mind. Regardless of the authors’ biases, the chapters provide detailed and relevant analyses of current Russian behaviour on the international scene, and allow for a deeper understanding of Russian actions via the examination of domestic political determinants. Taken with a grain of salt, this book is a valuable reference for scholars of international affairs.

-- Lisa Bokwa