

FITTING IN: NATO'S SPLIT PERSONALITY
IN THE POST COLD WAR SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

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Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been struggling to justify its continued existence following the collapse of its primary enemy. The new security environment, for its part, now presents challenges that go far beyond NATO's traditional balance of power and deterrent role as a regional military alliance. This paper seeks to reveal how the Alliance's response to these new tasks has been one best characterised by a paradigmatic dichotomy – that of Cold War realism and collective defence, versus the new world order of neo-liberal institutionalism and cooperative security. Using the latest enlargement round as a primary example, NATO's concurrent embodiment of both these world views is demonstrated. The essay ends with a brief consideration of where the Alliance is heading beyond the upcoming Strategic Concept review, and concludes that for now, the dualism that is NATO's current policy is not inconsistent with the security realities it is presently facing.

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In the aftermath of World War II, the future members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization came together with the hope of attaining territorial security in an atmosphere of hemispheric mistrust. In an effort to counter a Soviet Union that was openly prepared to propagate its own ideology, the five Brussels Treaty powers² and seven other Western nations³ formed a military association in 1949 that would possess its own nuclear arsenal, and thus be capable of effectively countering any potential attack the Soviet Union might launch. At that point, there existed a general understanding among members that the Organization would be simply a temporary security grouping for the sole purpose of collective defence. But four rounds of enlargement later,⁴ the Alliance remains. Given that its primary opponent, the Warsaw Pact, is no longer in existence, many argue that the Organization has not only outlived its usefulness, but it weakly survives with a mandate that is, in their view, incompatible with the security realities of today. Moreover, some suggest that maintaining NATO, let alone expanding it, is in itself a security liability for Europe, for it could serve to aggravate Russia and ultimately be a cause of new instability in the region. The ongoing NATO involvement in Yugoslavia makes this debate both immediate and compelling.⁵ While it is true that NATO is a Cold War by-product, struggling for redefinition post-1989, the recent events in the Balkans suggest that NATO's future (at least in the immediate term), is more certain now than it has been in over a decade. With this in mind, this analysis will show that the Alliance is evolving to reflect the new security environment by adapting to new threats, while remaining (perhaps a little too) mindful of the old. This adjustment is not an easy one, containing fundamental contradictions which the Alliance is attempting to reconcile. It will be seen that NATO is struggling to remain relevant by embracing contemporary notions of inclusion, (read collective and/or cooperative security). At the same time, however, many of the realist notions that the Alliance was founded upon continue to be upheld despite rapidly changing international security circumstances. This paper will explore the dichotomy between the old, Cold War mentality of crisis, and the new challenges presented by the current era to identify how NATO is evolving and where it is headed, using the lenses of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism as contrasting approaches to the dilemma. It will show that these two concepts are indeed reconcilable within the current security environment. While frequent references will be made to the Kosovo crisis, and what NATO's activities in the Balkans have revealed about its role and future, this paper's aim is to examine the theoretical path the Alliance is on, rather than to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the campaign recently carried out against Yugoslavia.

The argument will unfold in five parts. First, in order to frame the investigation, a brief discussion clarifying the theoretical frameworks will be undertaken. Next, the new security environment will be addressed to decipher what the Alliance is facing by way of challenges to its member states and regional stability. The distinction will be made between the implications of "new" forms of threat and those that have persisted from the days of the Cold War, with the backdrop of the aforementioned theories. The third section will then turn to how NATO has responded to both kinds of security quandaries. It will also define

² France, Holland, Belgium, the United Kingdom and Luxembourg.

³ The United States, Canada, Italy, Iceland, Denmark, Norway and Portugal.

⁴ Under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, the Alliance was broadened with the addition of Greece and Turkey in 1951, West Germany in 1955, Spain in 1982, and on March 12, 1999 added the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to its ranks.

⁵ While the NATO intervention into the Kosovo-Serbia crisis lays much bare regarding what NATO has become and what the future may hold, regrettably it is too current to be a comprehensive focus in this analysis. Notwithstanding this, however, occasional references will be made at relevant points to the ongoing situation in the Balkans.

the terms collective defence, and collective, common and cooperative security to provide clarity when they are used as descriptors. The fourth part will use evidence of the most recent enlargement decision to illustrate the Alliance's internal and external institutional change by considering how NATO has defended its choice, both in terms of collective defence *and* cooperative security. It will be seen that the geopolitical transformation in Europe has indeed had an enormous impact on the Alliance, yet it will underline the fact that NATO continues to harbour fear of old threats. The fifth section will take a broader view beyond enlargement to analyse the implications of a NATO now based on competing paradigms. The final part will consider what lies ahead for the Alliance, including ramifications for future expansion, and what the 1999 Strategic Concept⁶ foretells about NATO's ongoing self-prescribed mandate as it continues to balance strategies of collective defence with the activities and rhetoric of cooperative security.

I. THEORETICAL PARADIGMS

There have been innumerable publications in the last decade devoted to predicting whether NATO as a defence alliance will endure or collapse in the new environment. A useful way to approach this topic is to examine two theories that come to different conclusions on this front. Neorealism, and neoliberal institutionalism are excellent starting points, for both are systemic level theories that are concerned with outcomes rather than the political processes underlying alliances (Hellman and Wolf 1993: 4).

Neorealism, growing out of the realist perspective, regards the international system as one of anarchy, where states are concerned primarily with relative gains, and security is the overarching goal. According to these theorists, states are predisposed to conflict and competition, and contrasting interests often make cooperation difficult (Grieco 1990). States are unconvinced that institutions will prevent other states from "cheating", and they feel that any given member state will always have misgivings that other partners are gaining more from the alliance than they themselves (Hellmann and Wolf 1993:8). With this in mind, they explain the development of alliances as "primarily affected by common interests resulting from the structure of the international system and specific conflicts" (Waltz 1979; Snyder 1990), and forecast that should the circumstances under which an alliance was formed disappear, disintegration of the institution will inevitably follow (Hellmann and Wolf 1993). Under this theory, NATO was destined for expiration the moment the Eastern bloc began to collapse.

On the other hand, neoliberal institutionalists see institutions as a force that is underestimated by the neorealists. Robert Koehane and others postulate that institutions in fact are a reflection of member states' interests and therefore embody them, hence promoting cooperation "even when the state interests that led to the institutions' creation no longer exist" (1984:7). For neoliberal institutionalists, institutions are formed because they are more cost effective for state interaction, they reduce uncertainty, and they increase transparency between partners (Hellmann and Wolf 1990). These benefits, they argue, will remain even if an alliance's original purpose has faded. Therefore, they would suggest that, in the case of NATO, the Alliance would either simply persist for longer than the neorealists would predict, or it would begin to adapt itself to its new environment.

With the intention of keeping these two perspectives in mind, and further developing them throughout this analysis, attention can now turn to the security situation faced by NATO in the late 1990s.

⁶ Released in April 1999 at the Alliance's 50th Anniversary Summit in Washington DC.

II. THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

How one interprets NATO's continued existence and actions at the end of this decade depends not only on one's theoretical bent, but also on one's understanding of conflict. As there has been an overwhelming amount of discussion in recent years dedicated to the redefinition of security in the new world order, this is no easy task. However, it is necessary to conceptualize the threats that member states perceive⁷ before being able to accurately identify how or why the Alliance has adapted since the end of the Cold War. It must be borne in mind that the transition the international environment has undergone in the last ten years is not clear-cut, and the dangers facing Alliance members, while they have indeed broadened, have not moved from a definitive 'Cold War Set A' to a 'Post Cold War Set B'.

Given the atmosphere of 1949, NATO was created as a "single issue" institution (Rühle 1998), constructed to act as a deterrent and a defence against a specific threat. It was designed to operate within the realist framework of a bi-polar system characterized by two hegemonic powers, with states as the primary actors. This is the type of alliance that neorealists continue to perceive. Most analysts agree that the Cold War arrangement was comfortably predictable and, some hold, extremely stable, as two clearly delineated blocs worked to balance each other with what can be understood as strong and credible deterrent mechanisms. Of course, any certainty allowed by such an arrangement was lost as the Eastern Bloc began disintegrating in the late 1980s, leaving in its trail an emergent system with one single hegemony, and an explosion of non-state actors making their way into the realm of international politics.

TRADITIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS VS. THE NEW THREATS

Neorealists argue that power politics and the understanding of security as directly related to territorial integrity remain paramount in the current international arena. Conversely, many suggest that the importance of realpolitik has diminished relative to other concerns that ignore borders. John Barrett has declared that it is now highly unlikely that any NATO member will be subject to a direct attack, and has forecast the dilution of the Alliance into a 'NATO Lite', with fewer capabilities and a diminished mandate (Barrett 1994:114). But if the threat is no longer direct, what dangers remain or have developed? The prominent topic of discussion among contemporary conflict analysis scholars is intra-state conflict—that characterized most often as regional or local, with ethnic or other non-state actors choosing violence as a means to an end—be that end *inter alia*, desired territory or boundary disputes, self-determination or even basic recognition as a national entity within the international system. Further complicating the security landscape is the fact that there is no simple surgical solution to these usually deep-rooted issues.

But the current threats are not limited to such things as ethnic representation or disputes over territory. Beyond these, and often stemming from them, the global community must face such nebulous issues as weapons proliferation (both conventional and weapons of mass destruction) to state and non-state actors alike, terrorism, environmental degradation, and uncontrolled refugee flows. In short, these factors all have the potential to lead to destabilization of the European region, and ostensibly, could pose a threat to a country's territory by increasing the possibility of an outbreak of conventional warfare.

⁷ When discussing how NATO as a collection of countries perceives threats and responds to them it is essential to remember that the decision making structure of any organization is composed of its member states, all vying for the opportunity to further their own national interest within the larger body. Thus, when considering statements made, or policies ultimately adopted, by the Alliance, one cannot forget that, while the outcome may be regarded as a choice of the Alliance, the process is decidedly less homogeneous.

So while the realist/neorealist⁸ perspective is often immediately dismissed by liberals touting the growing importance of non-state actors, destabilizing factors that are not restricted by state boundaries, and issues that transcend the quest for power, the traditional view retains several salient points. It is true that threats to NATO members no longer take the form of a single enemy; however, the new components of security have already shown themselves to be un-detachable from earlier notions of state integrity by the fact that any of the above mentioned problems could bring instability onto the lap of member states.

The link between traditional risks and new problems is indisputable. It is essential to recognize, however, that the Western world tends to approach the two in vastly different ways. NATO, then, is faced with the arduous task of confronting all threats—both old and new—with a coherent strategy, unbroken by the opposing security paradigms represented. The evidence suggests that it is indeed succeeding at reconciling these two notions.

III. THE NATO RESPONSE: PERSEVERANCE

So as the Alliance emerged on this side of the Cold War, it was confronted with a collage of paradigmatic obstacles, security threats, transboundary concerns, and myriad other seemingly insurmountable issues, few of which immediately resembled NATO's original *raison d'être*. Given that the initial unwritten goal had now changed from "keeping the Americans in, the Germans down, and the Russians out," many observers called for the Alliance's immediate dissolution (Vlahos 1991:187–201; Bandow 1991:22–23; Kissinger 1990:A23; Mearsheimer 1990:5–6; Joffe 1992:47; Krasner 1993). As outlined above, neorealists suggested that since the overt external threat had dissolved, and there was now little chance of the re-nationalization of any European defence policies (Drew 1995), there was no sense in maintaining the regional military body and it would therefore be destined for extinction. Others held that sustaining the Alliance could contribute less to security than to the angering of a weakened and humiliated Russia, potentially pushing the latter to align with, or perhaps forge a counter military alliance to replace the Warsaw Pact, with China (Gaddis 1998:147), Iran (Sieff 1996:A12), or Iraq (Kosovo Crisis 1999). More recent recommendations for disbanding NATO rest on the premise that the importance and solidity of a transatlantic link is eroding as the United States becomes less willing to involve itself in the problems of Europe as a result of weakening economic and cultural ties and the development of a European defence identity independent of American involvement.⁹

But despite all the questioning of its continued existence, the Organization has persisted. In its 1991 Strategic Concept,¹⁰ the Alliance pledged to retain a flexible strategy to reflect new developments in the 'politico-military environment.' This was reiterated in the 1999 revision, where members again promised to keep all concepts, policies and arrangements continually under review "in light of the evolving security environment." Both documents were explicitly mindful of progress in the European security identity and of

⁸ Neorealists derive the core of their beliefs from those of traditional realists, but recognize that non-state actors are increasingly important in considerations of state security.

⁹ For a more comprehensive survey of this view, see Walt (1998/99). Further evidence of this can also be found in writings on the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), and the latest Strategic Concept which places renewed emphasis on the development of the ESDI, the WEU and the OSCE.

¹⁰ Released at the Rome Summit of that year.

changes in risks to members' security. Though they were released nearly a decade apart, both attested to the same fundamental challenges and goals. The document coming out of the Rome Summit acknowledged that ethnic and territorial disputes in the neighbouring countries of Central and Eastern Europe could lead to crises inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on the security of the Alliance. (1991)

Similarly, the Washington Summit's Concept produced the following warning regarding potential threats to NATO countries' integrity that remain and continue to develop:

The security of the Alliance remains subject to a wide variety of military and non-military risks which are multi-directional and often difficult to predict. These risks include uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance, which could evolve rapidly... Ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and the dissolution of states can lead to local and even regional instability. The resulting tensions could lead to crises affecting Euro-Atlantic stability, to human suffering, and to armed conflicts. Such conflicts could affect the security of the Alliance by spilling over into neighbouring countries, including NATO countries. (1999)

The obvious example of this can be found in the situation that emerged in the Serbian province of Kosovo. As President Slobodan Milosevic repeatedly refused to cooperate with international diplomatic efforts or comply to continued demands for a halt to his aggressions on the ethnic Albania population in Kosovo, NATO's nightmare scenario gradually moved toward becoming a very real possibility. The chance that the instability in the region would spill over into neighbouring Albania and Macedonia given those countries' ethnic links with, and proximity to, the Serbian province, could have been the beginning of the collapse of security in the region. As the Alliance and the rest of the world watched, hundreds of thousands of refugees fled their homes into the neighbouring countries, causing widespread unrest,¹¹ and a recognized humanitarian disaster, as Albania and Macedonia in particular struggled to accommodate the unrelenting waves of displaced persons. The potential for Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey to be drawn into the fray (BBC News Online 1998) became too evident, as the possibility of regional conventional warfare moved closer toward becoming a palpable reality. With the latter two nations as NATO members (already harbouring old tensions), failure of the international community to prevent such an escalation could have ultimately threatened the security and cohesion of the Alliance; and was thus impetus enough for the Alliance to undertake a campaign of air strikes against Yugoslavia.¹² The implications of this conflict are explicit evidence to the severity of regional conflicts, and the importance that NATO places on them.

The Alliance's reaction to the most recent Balkan crisis is a manifestation of its acknowledgement of the changing global context. Other threats were also acknowledged in April's Strategic Concept. Members stated that:

Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organized crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of

¹¹ Witness violent protests held outside NATO members' embassies in Macedonia and Albania, etc.

¹² Also at stake, of course, was NATO's reputation, for diplomatic efforts had been candidly backed up by the threat of NATO action had Serbian compliance not been realized.

armed conflicts, can also pose problems for security and stability affecting the Alliance.
(1999)

The two Strategic Concepts could, however, be little more than fabricated documents put on paper to exhibit that NATO is indeed attentive to the context it now finds itself in, to bear testament to an organization keeping up with the times in an effort to remain pertinent.

Before the Kosovo crisis erupted, some neoliberal institutionalists embraced a bureaucratic explanation for NATO's stamina, proposing that this endurance was a result of the entrenched bureaucracy the Organization has developed, which in itself acts as a sustaining mechanism in the life of the Alliance (Walt 1997; 1998/99). Old school realists have put forward the hypothesis that NATO was, and remains, unconvinced of the end of the Cold War, and has been disguising its continued primary directive of military defence under the rubric of adjusting to the new environment. Some have suggested that activities in Bosnia and the 1997 announcement to enlarge were NATO's attempts to create a new purpose for itself (NATO at 50 1999). It has also been postulated that the Alliance's demise has been staved off by the United States in an effort to maintain that country's pre-eminence over the European members through its power in NATO (Walt 1998/99:10). On the other hand, some hold that those very Alliance states at the mercy of American whims through the Organization's institutions have kept NATO alive for the purpose of enjoying the almost free American protection that has been implicit therein (Walt 1998/99:10).

Any of these hypotheses could be argued relatively convincingly were it not for several institutional changes, decisions and actions since the beginning of this decade that have suggested otherwise. Although some of the above suppositions contain components of truth in explaining NATO's perseverance, individually they do not account sufficiently for why and how the Organization has transformed in the last ten years. To develop a picture more representative of NATO's evolution, one must look beyond single issue explanations and consider the larger international context. Elements of the path NATO has taken can be clarified by the assumptions of both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. NATO's continued emphasis on the importance of Article V¹³ finds its explanation in the former, while at the same time, the latter theory shows the Alliances as beneficial in its promotion of cooperation, facilitation of communication, and its impact on interest formulation and norm creation (Hellman and Wolf 1993:15). Further on this point, liberal thinkers suggest that:

international institutions are easier to maintain than they are to create because they are so difficult to construct that, once created, 'it may be rational to obey their rules if the alternative is their breakdown, since even an imperfect (institution) may be superior to any politically feasible replacement.' (Keohane 1984:100)

Indeed, the evidence does suggest that the Alliance is recognizing that the best way to protect against these dangers is to assume a role that is compatible with the new, increasingly integrated structure of European and transatlantic relations, and the argument is often made that a common defence structure alone no longer provides enough cohesion for NATO (Haglund and Pentland 1998:107). But, as will be seen, NATO's actions reveal that it continues to foster traditional notions of security as a threat to territory (and Kosovo reaffirms this), suggesting that observers cannot be quick to dismiss the optic provided by the neorealist alliance theory.

¹³ This Article will be discussed in more depth later in the paper, but essentially it declares that an attack against one member is an attack against all.

COLLECTIVE DEFENCE VS. COLLECTIVE AND COOPERATIVE SECURITY

Before exploring this hypothesis further, it is essential to understand several concepts that are often used to describe paths the Alliance has followed, and is following. In recent years NATO statements, communiqués, and publications have all taken to utilizing the terms of collective, common, or cooperative security, in contrast to the collective defence that had previously been the Organization's definitive feature. However, these expressions are seldom officially explained, and it is questionable whether those employing them completely understand either their meanings or their implications.

COLLECTIVE DEFENCE

The easiest of all of these concepts is that of collective defence. Though the term existed before 1949, a common understanding of collective defence with regards to NATO can be found in Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them... shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area (NATO Handbook: 232).

In the context of NATO, then, collective defence is based on countering traditional challenges as understood by the realist/neorealist paradigm, specifically to territory, and finds its focus on an identifiable external threat or adversary. For example, George Liska has pointed out that "Alliances are against, and only derivatively for, someone or something" (1952:12). Glen Snyder reiterated this in postulating that they are constructed solely as a means of security against an adversary (1990:106).

COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Another expression that has been in existence for some time is collective security. Employed often during the construction of the League of Nations, this concept goes beyond the pure idea of defence to include, according to Inis Claude, "arrangements for facilitating peaceful settlement of disputes," assuming that the mechanisms of preventing war and defending states under armed attack will "supplement and reinforce each other" (1984:245). Writing during the Cold War, Claude identifies the concept as the post WWI name given by the international community to the "system for maintenance of international peace... intended as a replacement for the system commonly known as the balance of power" (1984:247). Most applicable to widely inclusive international organizations such as the League and the United Nations, ideally, the arrangement would transcend the reliance on deterrence of competing alliances through a network or scheme of "national commitments and international mechanisms." As in collective defence, collective security is based on the risk of retribution, but it can also involve economic and diplomatic responses in addition to military retribution. From this, it is theorized that perfected collective security would discourage potential aggressors from angering a "mass of states" (Claude 1984:247). Like balance of power, collective security works on the assumption that any potential aggressor would be deterred by the prospect of joint retaliation, but it goes beyond the military realm to include a wider array of security problems. It assumes that states will relinquish sovereignty and "freedom of action or inaction" (Claude 1984:253) to increasing interdependence and the premise of the indivisibility of peace (Claude 1984:250). The security that can be derived from this is part of the foundation of the neoliberal institutionalist argument.

Isabelle François offers a more recent definition of collective security which includes a "moral obligation felt by the members," of a pact, based on common interest, which "may not be direct nor vital, but

still sufficiently compelling to prompt a collective decision to act” (1999:2). Thus, collective security can be interpreted to be an almost idealistic situation. It raises collective defence to a higher level by international arrangements that establish the notion that *all* states will react to *any* sort of instability—from direct attack to indirect situations that may have the potential to place the international order in jeopardy—thus effectively dissuading such an occurrence. As Karl Deutsch articulated in the late 1950s, an arrangement of this kind would eventually replace ‘the logic of anarchy’ with the ‘logic of community’ (Deutsch 1957:5). Almost utopic in nature, collective security as understood in this way seems to assume that conflict can be eradicated. Therefore, though it represents an admirable goal that appears to be the objective of neoliberal institutionalists’ development of organizations, it is unlikely that true collective security can be achieved within the current international structure.

COMMON AND COOPERATIVE SECURITY

Common security, in contrast to collective defence and distinct from collective security, places the emphasis on working *with* former adversaries to face non-traditional and transboundary dangers that include social and economic aspects above and beyond military issues (Koerner 1997:1–2). First employed by NATO at the London Summit of 1990, and institutionalized in the declaration produced there, the notion of common security marked the beginning of a shift in the Alliance mindset from one of exclusivity and reaction to positive inclusion across the region.¹⁴ This concept was subsequently broadened to that of *cooperative* security, suggesting not just de-emphasizing the restrictive nature of collective defence, but actually adopting a proactive stance that would push for increased transparency and enhanced dialogue with former adversaries and other non-member states (Koerner 1997:1). To this, François adds that cooperative security is made up of a “community” which allows member states to define some interests in terms of this grouping, almost supra-nationally (1999:2). In this way, threats need not be addressed by all members, for the arrangement is more flexible than either collective defence or collective security. Another definition that has been offered sees cooperative security as a:

demilitarized concept of security that has resulted in imbuing security with political and human dimensions, and in basing security on confidence and cooperation, the elaboration of peaceful means of dispute settlement between states, the consolidation of justice and democracy in civil society, and the advancement of human freedom and rights, including national minority rights. (Leatherman 1993:414)

The North Atlantic Treaty also left room for this in its Article II, which pledged that the members would:

contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being.... (NATO Handbook:231)

Since the 1991 Rome Summit, “cooperative security” has begun to appear in communiqués of ministerial and summit meetings of the North Atlantic Council, suggesting that this concept is one that is increasingly being adopted by the Alliance members as a guide to policy. Cooperative security clearly reflects the concepts imbued within neoliberal institutionalism in the internal stability that it posits to result from states cooperating through institutions.

¹⁴ This inclusion was based on geo-strategic assumptions, though, so it would not be unlimited.

The tone set by the London and Rome Summits was unmistakably a response to the changing security architecture that had begun to characterize Europe in the early 1990s. The trend of integration had taken off, as the European Community (EC)¹⁵ and the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)¹⁶ solidified, and the region saw the role of transnational organizations elevated by broader participation. However, it would be a mistake to take NATO's declarations and the terms they employ at face value, for it is clear that there was and is more going on than simply an alliance deciding to befriend all to keep up with an emerging European tendency toward inclusion. For while NATO's response to its new surroundings can be interpreted as part of the Western movement toward integration and inclusion, cooperation and positive engagement, the threat-based strategy of deterrence has remained central to the Organization's mandate. According to John Baylis, "the Alliance itself embodies two 'diametrically opposed world views'"—that of the optimistic utopians, and that of the pessimistic realists—where the former sees a harmonization of interests in Europe and a "taming of power," and the latter re-emphasises the importance of "threat-based deterrents" (1998:23–25). This dichotomy of motives is most clearly evident when one examines the grounds of the July 1997 Madrid Summit decision to once more enlarge the Alliance.

IV. WHAT ENLARGEMENT REVEALS ABOUT NATO'S EVOLUTION

Since its inception, NATO has seen three completed processes of enlargement, and has recently undergone a fourth. Based on the arguments for and against this latest round, it is evident that NATO is indeed cognizant of its evolving environment and the shift of priorities therein, but it is also apparent that the Organization is in no hurry to surrender its neorealist central tenet of collective defence and national interests. However, NATO has been careful to place the emphasis on the more progressive notion of security, and the merits of inclusion as the neoliberal institutionalists propound, perhaps in an effort to appear more forward-thinking to both its critics and its former enemies. It is an uneasy marriage of policy, but a marriage nonetheless, and the process of enlargement has laid this bare.

One of the central problems remains the issue of East–West relations. This latest round brought former adversaries into the Alliance fold, and its boundaries closer to that of Russia. Because of this, as well as the fact that many of the candidates are rebuilding or discovering democratic systems for the first time, more stringent requirements were placed on these nations than those that acceded before. The criteria reflected the changing nature of the global security environment with a focus on democratic systems of government, a free market economy, and civilian/democratic control over the military (Study on NATO Enlargement 1995).¹⁷ The process also gave attention to relationships with NATO and neighbouring nations, as well as the treatment of minorities within the applicant states. It is true that these requirements did stress features of stability and humanitarian concerns more than in the past, and are thus indicative of new NATO policies of reassurance and cooperative security.

But there were purely realist criteria included as well. The 1995 *Study on NATO Enlargement* emphasized the importance of new members being capable of contributing to collective defence efforts. Other factors that were also taken into account included ability and/or willingness to comply with NATO

¹⁵ Since renamed the European Union.

¹⁶ Renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1994.

¹⁷ As will be discussed later, a fourth requirement focused on the applicant state's ability to contribute to NATO collective defence efforts and new roles such as peacekeeping.

troops stationing and nuclear policy, performance in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program,¹⁸ and in the Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) missions in Bosnia (Kocher and Thompson 1996:2). So from the view of the Alliance, classic security remains an integral and inescapable aspect of its mandate.

THE ENLARGEMENT DEBATE

Even though the underlying motive of NATO enlargement was born out of the desire to remain a defensive alliance to preserve peace in the Euro–Atlantic area, and to continue to provide a feeling of territorial security for all of its members, the arguments that NATO now puts forward in support of enlargement place the emphasis on cooperative security more than on the pledge of Article V, thus turning from realism/neorealism to neoliberal institutional assumptions. George Robertson, the British Defence Secretary who recently replaced Javier Solana as NATO’s new Secretary General, has listed as two of his priorities: further “expansion into eastern Europe”, and working closely with Russia, Ukraine and other former Soviet bloc republics (CNN 1999). These goals again reflect the inclination to inclusion.

The equating of enlargement with cooperation is also apparent in the *Study on NATO Enlargement* where of the following highlighted benefits, only the second–to–last one addresses collective defence. The study claims that the resulting larger organization will enhance stability and security for all countries in the Euro–Atlantic area by:

- Encouraging and supporting democratic reforms, including civilian and democratic control over the military;
- Fostering in new members of the Alliance the patterns and habits of co–operation, consultation and consensus building which characterize relations among current allies;
- Promoting good–neighbourly relations, which would benefit all countries in the Euro–Atlantic area, both members and non–members of NATO;
- Emphasizing common defence, extending its benefits, and increasing transparency in defence planning and military budgets, thereby reducing the likelihood of instability that might be engendered by an exclusively national approach to defence policies;
- Reinforcing the tendency toward integration and co–operation in Europe based on shared democratic values, and thereby curbing the countervailing tendency towards disintegration along ethnic and territorial lines;
- Strengthening the Alliance’s ability to contribute to European and international security, including through peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the OSCE and peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council as well as other new missions;
- Strengthening and broadening the Trans–Atlantic partnership (NATO 1995).

¹⁸ An association formalized in January 1994 to “forge new security relationships between the North Atlantic Alliance and all those invited into the Partnership.” See the NATO Handbook, 266. In addition to NATO members, the partnership includes many Central and Eastern European nations, as well as Russia.

The apparent benefits to be gained by broadening the Alliance largely find their focus on new notions of security—on solidifying relations and elevating NATO's ability to participate in non-traditional missions (even under the mandate of the United Nations or the OSCE)—yet again demonstrating the Alliance's evolution into an institution with a split-personality. The items at the centre of the debate over enlargement reveal these contrasting concerns of NATO as it passes its fiftieth anniversary. A survey of arguments against the Alliance's growth, followed by NATO's responses, once more makes this dichotomy obvious.

Those speaking out in opposition to the announcement to invite the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary into the 'club' also find basis for their arguments in both liberal and realist grounds. They range from conservative reservations such as the concern that too many members will weaken the Alliance's decision making structure, to radical alarmism charging that preventing NATO from expanding is insufficient. Much like those who questioned the Organization's perseverance in the early 1990s, the latter camp argues that the best thing for the 'archaic' military body would be to completely disband it. Other liabilities highlighted include the danger of creating new dividing lines in Europe and the financial burdens that could be too much for the current members to bear, let alone the newly democratic Eastern nations already struggling through a period of economic reform. On this point, the issue of United States hegemony has again been raised by both American and European opponents, the former complaining of the probability of having to shoulder too large a part of the inevitable bill, and the latter protesting against the apparent expansion of American economic imperialism, as new members are 'forced' to upgrade their military and communication equipment to match the standards set by the Alliance. Moreover, as mentioned above, some suggest that enlargement is little more than an exercise in extending American hegemony over the European region.

Additional concerns include the possibility that NATO will be unable to guarantee security to its members as its size grows. Berthold Meyer and others have put forward the argument that beyond this, enlargement may ultimately cause insecurity among those not invited to join (Meyer 1995:38; Roche 1998). Meyer cites difficulties in decision-making coherence that the Alliance experienced in Bosnia as an example of disunity already existing within the Organization,¹⁹ and suggests that the only way to stabilize Europe through enlargement would be to bring all countries in at the same time. As this is clearly not a possibility given the decrease in efficacy and cohesion that an unlimited membership would bring, Meyer proposes that the best route to security is through the liberal approach of systematic economic assistance and democratization (Meyer 1995:39), not by NATO expansion. Critics also accuse NATO of having no influence over internal conflicts, and some hold that the OSCE would better fulfil the part of an overarching security body for the region, even though this body holds no military forces.

NATO appears to believe that while some of these issues contain elements of real concern, the majority are outweighed by the empirical evidence, and by the changing nature of the world system. But once again, the responses offered by the Alliance are founded in a dual understanding of the types of threats the regional security arrangement may be forced to face in the coming years. The Alliance seems hesitant to choose between them, opting instead to attempt to reconcile the two mechanisms of retaliation to the present environment—collective defence, or cooperative security.

To the charge that having more parties in the decision making structure makes consensus increasingly difficult—an effect that is particularly evident in the UN—NATO replies (in good realpolitik alliance form) that the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were selected because their ideologies and security goals align

¹⁹ Kosovo again brought problems of Alliance to the forefront as fault lines began to emerge over the need for ground troops and the proposed oil embargo against Yugoslavia.

with the present members, and it is unlikely that, as junior participants in the Organization, they will stray far from the 'party line'. Granted, as Bosnia and Kosovo have shown, the United States is largely responsible for determining that line, and it is indeed often difficult to keep all nineteen Allies and their electorates in full support of a given course of action, let alone achieve fluid consensus on policy formation. The NATO rebuttal to this is that of course there will be dissent in the diplomatic process, but the importance should be placed on common values, goals and interests, something the Alliance leadership sees all members as sharing.

As for the argument that broadening the Alliance will push Russia away, potentially jeopardizing progress already made in the East–West peace process, members set out about creating the NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC), established by the NATO–Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations at the December 1997 Paris Summit. Presumably out of concern that the July announcement of enlargement had created unsettling, easterly moving waves of mistrust, official statements affirm that this institution will work to keep communication lines open, intentions transparent, and ensure Russia's continued engagement.²⁰ The liberal institutional tendencies in this are obvious. But the Alliance's continued traditional realist worries regarding Russian intentions and unpredictability remain evident between the lines of cooperation, for the Founding Act is not legally binding, nor does it provide a veto to the former enemy. A recent report by the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) has explained that the PJC will enable consultation with Russia, "but only as long as it agrees with NATO policy" (Smith and Butcher 1999). The Cold War hangover is unmistakable, and NATO's realist disposition, though disguised, remains, and even flourishes under the front of neoliberal institutionalism. And, upon the end of NATO's recent bombing campaign, as Russian troops claimed control of the airport in the Kosovo capital of Pristina unbeknownst to NATO information sources and with no prior communication from the Kremlin, NATO's fears on this front appear to have been substantiated.

Concern that new divisions will be formed in Europe between the invitees and those not extended the offer of membership is also dismissed by the Alliance. NATO points out that the nations of Central and Eastern Europe are all moving in the same direction, that is, integration into other existing regional structures in an ever–expanding "network of cooperative security relationships" (Solana 1999). Furthermore, official NATO publications reiterate that there is no longer an ideological rift to reinforce divisions should they occur. NATO maintains that the door of enlargement is not closed to further rounds, and while this is not necessarily without its complications, it does temporarily serve to placate those not invited. As well, as former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana argued, it provides an incentive for Central and Eastern European countries to "accelerate their political, economic and military reforms, to bury old enmities and to reject the destructive nationalism of the past" (1999). While idealists and integrationists can interpret this as creating stability through the embrace of cooperative security, the realists in NATO see this as a means of states using institutions to diffuse potential enemies, a move entirely in keeping with individual nations' interests. In this case, the duality is reconcilable for the action is the same, but the differing motives remain clear.

The charge that enlargement will be too heavy a financial burden on both new and old members is also misplaced from the viewpoint of NATO (Solana 1999). The rebuttal offered is that acceding nations were already in the process of upgrading their militaries and would have continued to do so with or without membership in the Alliance. In fact, now that their militaries are being reconstructed toward NATO interoperability, the Alliance appears confident that they will be more effective in a military coalition than if this were not the case. NATO acknowledges that there will indeed be costs for the current members as well, but US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright holds that the preventative effects the Alliance produces are well worth the expense. She quotes the president of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Havel, in saying: "Even the costliest preventive security is cheaper than the cheapest war" (1998). In the realist spirit of the arms race,

²⁰ See any given NATO publication, for example, Rühle (1998), or Solana (1998).

this was the justification for contributing almost endless funds to the purchase and development of weapons and weapons systems—all in the name of Cold War deterrence. On this point, the realist rationale within the Alliance’s argument is clearly identifiable.

Current members also have a propensity to point out that the likelihood of NATO nations coming to the defence of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, even as non-members, was high to begin with. Though the chance of any of these three nations finding themselves under direct attack is slim, the Alliance’s retained commitment to Article V acts as a deterrent mechanism by threatening full retaliation. Regardless, say NATO sources, the nations of Central and Eastern Europe are already viewed as Western allies in the new security environment, and to make their military systems completely interoperable can do nothing but strengthen security, both by way of defence, and for future out-of-area operations.

NATO has rationalized all aspects of the most current round of expansion using both old and new justifications. It should be reiterated at this point, however, that though there are certainly two distinct security concepts, and two theoretical approaches to dealing with them, there are also areas where these concerns overlap.

V. LIVING WITH THE DICHOTOMY

Solana did acknowledge the necessity of balancing the old with the new. In a speech last year, he reiterated that NATO must, “continue to be relevant for organizing the collective defence [of its members] but also must tackle new missions,” such as peace support operations and counter proliferation efforts (1998). Once more, the analysis turns to the two-pronged challenge the Alliance is facing, and two of the possible ways to address this almost task.

One observer suggests that another way to approach the apparent theoretical contradiction in how NATO is managing international security. Wolfgang Koerner articulates the two frameworks as balance of power and institutionalism (1997:4). The first coincides with what this paper has been referring to as realist/neorealist traditional threats based on notions of the risk to territory and conventional warfare, and the second with the neoliberal institutionalist view of a move toward cooperative security, and the improbable attainment of collective security through institutional inclusion.

As has been shown by the example of enlargement and the spin that Alliance officials have put on it, the overt portrayal is that NATO is doing its best to move toward the latter approach. This is also suggested by the Alliance’s often stated commitment to integration, cooperation and transparency. Beyond enlargement, this is also discernible in the creation of the PFP, the development of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC, renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997), the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) , the NATO-Ukraine Charter, and the Mediterranean Dialogue, among others.²¹

However, if there was a time in the early to mid-1990s that balance of power issues waned in importance, the setting at the end of the decade now suggests its resurgence. It appears the trend toward institutionalism is potentially once more giving way to issues of power, as instability in Russia again restates

²¹ All of these sub-institutions and dialogues enjoyed NATO’s renewed commitment in the 1999 Strategic Concept.

the possibility of a need for collective defence and power balancing, and the crisis in Kosovo adds fuel to the old fire of strained East–West relations.²²

Because NATO is currently entertaining both means of managing security simultaneously, it is not surprising that its motives and methods are often subject to criticism and misinterpretation. John Baylis argues however, that NATO is not alone in attempting to embody both while making the transition into the post–Cold War world. He attributes it to the environment itself, where Europe has become “an area where old and new concepts of security, while being contested and on a collision course, are nevertheless being put to work simultaneously” (Baylis 1998:23).

Certainly, there are other examples beyond enlargement of NATO’s continued dedication to its traditional mindset, and though it is impossible to explore them all here, one of the most prominent is the Alliance’s addiction to its nuclear weapons. Although NATO has repeatedly assured those around it that it has “no intention, no plan and no reason” to create additional nuclear weapons deposits, it still clings mercilessly to its first use policy (much to Russian chagrin)—justifying it as a deterrent against any kind of weapon of mass destruction that could threaten its members. Granted, NATO has indeed scaled back its nuclear stockpiles (NATO 1997), and established a Nuclear Planning Group that allows for all members to participate in developing Alliance nuclear policy and posture. As well, conventional forces have, to an extent, been reduced and streamlined (Joulwan 1997). Again, however, the traditional mindset must now coexist with changing international norms.

Unquestionably, an evolving and presumably reinvigorated NATO is an invaluable asset to European collective defence. The fact that it continues to be perceived as a power/military body is evident both in the expressed desire of applicant nations to be under the security blanket and the distrust for the Alliance emanating from Moscow. As an instrument of collective defence, NATO unavoidably retains the tenets inherent in the realist concept of the balance of power.

But as an instrument of increased integration and cooperative security for the transatlantic region, NATO also finds a definition. The Alliance provides a cohesive military infrastructure it would not have otherwise. US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott asked the question: “If NATO did not exist today, would we have to invent it?” He answered: “emphatically, yes” (1999). It would look much different than it does now, he continued, but it was nevertheless needed as a regional security ensurer and builder.

Those arguing in favour of the Alliance’s perseverance and evolution toward cooperative security put forward several further observations. They point out that the United Nations is often unable to react to conflicts with the expediency required as a result of too large and diverse a decision making body; that the Western European Union lacks a mandate and the strength required to execute such a role; and that the OSCE remains simply a very broadly based political organization. NATO proponents suggest that this leaves the Alliance as the only body (regional or otherwise) able to respond with the immediacy, strength and cohesion of action necessitated by security or stability–threatening situations. They are quick to point out, however, that this is not to say that in its present form NATO is ideal for the job, for any observer can glean that the mistakes of Bosnia, and the lessons of Kosovo suggest otherwise. But though it may not be perfectly suited, nor completely prepared, to deal with these new security circumstances, NATO supporters hold that it is the best the region has. And as Baylis has pointed out, fallibility does not equal futility (1998:25), so the Alliance refuses to give up.

²² Russian displeasure at the NATO involvement in the Balkans has been exposed through such things as the Russian withdrawal from NATO offices, cancelled diplomatic visits (in one case resulting in the Russian foreign minister turned his plane around in the sky, and heading back to Moscow), and repeated statements condemning the actions being taken by the Alliance. These actions have been tempered, however, by the dependence of that country on the West for financial support as it continues its transition amidst a collapsed economy.

VI THE WAY AHEAD

TRADITIONAL SECURITY AND FUTURE ROUNDS OF ENLARGEMENT

Though the former Secretary General maintained that enlargement should be a continuous and ongoing process (1999) and his successor strongly supports this view, potential scenarios for further enlargement bring with them additional difficulties that once more illustrate classical security concerns that contrast with the ideal that neoliberal institutionalism may promise. These are drawn out quite explicitly by the dilemma posed by future expansion processes.²³

Koerner identifies three possibilities: *open door*, where there is no limit to who could join (including Russia) other than a fulfilment of the qualification criteria and a desire to be a part of the Alliance (this would be consistent with collective security); *parallel expansion* in concert with the broadening of the European Union, thus limiting potential members to what the majority of Europeans consider “Europe” (more in keeping with cooperative security); and *limited enlargement*, where the number is capped according to “strategic criteria” (1997:4–5), (which corresponds most with traditional collective defence concerns). The majority of analysts voice serious concerns over the open door scenario, as it allows for the possibility that NATO could eventually develop into a toothless organization paralyzed and diffused by an enormous membership. The second case also comes with drawbacks, for while it excludes the Ukraine and Russia, the forecast size of the EU is approximately twenty–five countries. Once again, a military alliance of that size would no doubt suffer from a lack of strategic direction and cohesion (Koerner 1997), making it potentially ineffective not only for defence, but also for proactive collective security operations.

The final option, limited expansion, is arguably the most viable in light of NATO’s apparent goals for two reasons, both based on classical notions of security. First, Russia has been tolerant of enlargement thus far, but the farther the Alliance edges eastward, the less likely that that patience is to remain, again bringing old security concerns to the forefront. Second, it is evident that few NATO nations have an interest in including the Baltics or the Balkans in the Organization because of the ‘Russia factor’, and thus having to provide unequivocal security guarantees in these regions. Opting for limited enlargement would ensure that NATO would not become overburdened, and would help minimize potential conflict with Russia. Of course, the ramifications of shutting the door following the 1999 accession of the three new members would be problematic in the eyes of hopefuls, so it is likely that the Alliance will continue to move toward future rounds. But as history has shown, NATO could easily be confronted with a vastly changed Europe in less than a decade, so making hard and fast predictions is not prudent.

The difficulty that future enlargement presents to NATO once again highlights the dilemma between pursuing the inclusion of neoliberal institutionalism, while attempting to sustain neorealist concerns regarding alliance cohesion, relations with the East, and ultimately, regional security.

REFLECTIONS ON THE 1999 STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND A FEW RECOMMENDATIONS

As this paper has shown, the current evidence suggests that the prevailing trend is away from the classical security outlook of the Cold War toward a purely cooperative, peace–creating mindset. Yet, it would be an error to assume that, first, realist power concerns have been abandoned, or second, that they will be soon.

²³ On a point of interest, the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia recently called for NATO to expedite its application into the Alliance, given that NATO troops are currently using FYROM soil as a staging area to Kosovo (“Macedonia appeals for swift entry into NATO” [28 March 1999]).

This is not a reason for pessimism. The way ahead for NATO will continue to include Article V, but will increasingly involve activities of institutionalism, and the idealistic and thus far elusive goal of collective security. Indeed, the 1999 Strategic Concept does disclose much about how NATO will behave in the coming decade. The conclusions of the Washington Summit reveal that there will be an increased commitment to crisis management, conflict prevention and peacekeeping operations in and around the European region (a cause that the Kosovo crisis has made all the more immediate, and that NATO's actions have proven). Cooperative security will be the mechanism of choice to deal with these new threats, for classic military operations alone are an inadequate means of altering, establishing and assisting in the maintenance of peace institutions. Surgical operations are no longer the effective method, and long-term engagements are the new reality, as Bosnia has shown, and Kosovo reiterated.

As a military mechanism of enforcement, NATO can help buttress UN, OSCE and other multilateral diplomatic initiatives, and this was pledged in the new Concept. Increased use of soft power is a characteristic of the new politics of the post-Cold War era, but in many cases, it alone is impotent, as the failed Rambouillet talks confirmed.²⁴ NATO can provide the military compellence often necessary to back up diplomacy, and this is where it will be most needed in the coming decade. This showed itself to be the case in Kosovo. A NATO with a renewed mandate can prove an indispensable infrastructure, ready to combat the new dangers, specifically of ethnic conflict, rogue states, and weapons proliferation. It will, however, retain preparedness for the old threats that still endure in situations such as an increasingly unstable and unpredictable Russia, a perpetually unsettled Middle East, and of course, continued ethnic tensions in the immediate European theatre.

On November 12, 1998, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana identified two principles that should serve as guideposts to managing security in the 21st century: humanity and democracy. NATO certainly has a role to play within this context, but the Alliance must remain particularly attentive to its surroundings, and aware of the duality of mandate it embodies, if it is to retain and enhance its utility. There are those new security dangers that cannot be saved by a military coalition, such as failing economies and elusive terrorists, and NATO is clearly not the most ideal institution to address the root causes of conflict. On the other hand, security threats to territory cannot be averted by such pursuits as integrative motions or non-proliferation programs. Working with the other institutions in the region, however, can do nothing but benefit security on all fronts.

Despite some problematic attributes, enlargement of the Organization is consistent with increased integration of Europe, and will prove itself to be an invaluable contribution to the strength and weight the Alliance carries both within and outside the Euro-Atlantic theatre. It is also evident, however, that future rounds must be approached with caution. Though NATO did little to seriously re-evaluate its posture, either nuclear or conventional, in its 1999 Strategic Concept, or overtly turn its focus from collective defence to cooperative security, the words of the document are mindful of this trend and the balance it needs to strike. Both elements will remain, and realism will have to coexist with the liberal institutional perspective at least for the time being. In this way, NATO will move into the future with a convincing and capable air, and will indeed be both qualified and suited to work effectively toward true security.

CONCLUSION

It is certain that NATO faces a tough road in the coming decades. As a relic of the Cold War, it is now struggling to evolve within the most challenging security environment the global community

²⁴ Issues of sovereignty remain, however, for NATO acted without a UN mandate in Kosovo, which in effect undermined the authority of that body. This appears to be something the Alliance is mindful of, and will no doubt strive to protect against such a situation developing in the future.

has ever faced. Contemporary security, as shown, is obscure, unpredictable, and perilous—begging no easy answer. It exists on a level beyond that of the nation–state and realpolitik. NATO’s response to the two types of threats is understandably also not homogenous in nature. For the Alliance to abandon its original mandate of collective defence would not only be institutionally next to impossible to achieve, it would be strategically unwise, given that all the elements inherent in traditional security concerns have not disappeared with the Berlin Wall. Hence, Article V, for the time being, remains a pillar of the Alliance. The Organization’s struggle to maintain security and stability in the Balkans is a testament to this. But as the example of NATO’s handling of the latest round of enlargement has shown, while it continues to be integral, collective defence is no longer the only pillar. Cooperative security has stepped up beside it, and is (and rightly so) beginning to steal the spotlight. Neoliberal institutionalism has found just as large a place in the new NATO as old realism and neorealism have maintained. As the analysis of enlargement and how NATO has been living with the dichotomy have revealed, both these activities are a reflection on the security landscape that is now Europe. The threats are numerous and varied, and occasionally even dependent on, or indistinguishable from, one another. And yes, they are often paradigmatic opposites, at times seemingly irreconcilable, but as this is the reality, so too are the responses NATO must offer. The military alliance should not be criticized for imperfectly moving into the largely uncharted territory of cooperation and integration, or for seeking to redefine itself beyond the death of its original purpose, when it is doing so by adopting the late 1990s’ humanitarian sentiments of inclusion, of conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. The pace of transformation of the security environment in the last ten years is unprecedented, but the nature of threats have been changing and evolving since international relations were born. And there is little to suggest that the duality that NATO is currently grappling with is an entirely new one, nor that it will fade in the future. Baylis quotes E.H. Carr as arguing in 1939 that:

the most realistic aim of European statemen (sic)... should be to continue the search for that ‘uneasy compromise’ between the realities of power and the moral and prudent imperatives of building a more peaceful, just and stable European order. (1998)

There is no doubt that understandings of security will continue to evolve as the Alliance moves into its second half–century, and the struggle to reconcile responses will not be quick to fade—but NATO is indeed evolving to meet these challenges, as its activities of the last ten years have demonstrated.

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