

Back to the Future?
The Lessons of Counterinsurgency for Contemporary
Peace Operations

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Abstract:

A recent consensus has emerged within peace operations doctrine validating “robust” or “assertive” peacekeeping as an effective mechanism to intervene in complex and volatile intrastate conflicts. The assertion of the validity of “robust peacekeeping” is problematic due to a lack of empirical evidence supporting the application of this management tool. Yet the similarity between the context and tasks required of such a “robust” intervention and those required in a counterinsurgency campaign allow past counterinsurgency doctrine to act as a yardstick to evaluate contemporary doctrine. Moreover, principles drawn from the British approach to counterinsurgency can inform current peace operations practice. This paper evaluates the content of the new “consensus” through a comparison to the British approach to counterinsurgency and proposes key recommendations for the improvement of peace operations doctrine. The conclusion suggests that the principles of British counterinsurgency can provide a framework to guide the further development of doctrine. The best way forward may be ‘back to the future.’

Introduction: Post-Cold War Peacekeeping

Perhaps the greatest change between the nature of the interventions being conducted in the post-Cold War period and the majority of the previous peacekeeping missions was the fact that an increasing number of missions were being conducted intervening in intrastate conflicts with more complex and volatile operational environments. Often the conflict was ongoing, there was no peace to keep, consent of the local parties was ambiguous and lacked consistency, and impartiality was difficult to maintain.¹

The difficulties of these missions led the majority of observers to conclude that the mechanism of traditional peacekeeping was only of limited utility in the managing of these types of conflicts.² This realization has led analysts in different directions. Some suggested that traditional peacekeeping could still be of some use, although limited, in certain types of internal conflict, depending upon the level of consent of the belligerents and their support for a resolution of the conflict.³

On the other hand, some observers presented the idea that the principles of traditional peacekeeping could be updated and modified to deal with the new conditions characteristic of the changed operational environment of the post-Cold War period. They called for a new doctrine to guide the more complex post-Cold War interventions. Indeed, Ruggie, perhaps the first observer to frame the call, identified a “doctrinal void”, between peacekeeping and traditional enforcement action, that had to be filled.⁴ The idea of assertive or robust peacekeeping as a mechanism to allow intervention into active conflicts emerged. Indeed, an evolutionary process occurred whereby new forms of peacekeeping doctrine were developed to guide interventions into ongoing conflicts in the “grey area” between traditional peacekeeping and enforcement. British, French, U.S., NATO, forces all developed new forms of doctrine allowing for more “assertive” intervention into ongoing conflicts

where consent may not be present, combining larger, more combat capable forces and mandates allowing for the wider use of force than in traditional peacekeeping.⁵

The notion of assertive peacekeeping has been heavily influenced by the experience of the post-Cold War “grey area” operations.⁶ Few peacekeeping operations during the Cold War possessed the characteristics common to the post-Cold War environment.⁷ Although a consensus has emerged, the relatively few cases from which relevant principles can be drawn to guide the development of new doctrine undermines somewhat its empirical validity, this despite assertions that the doctrine has both empirical and theoretical support.⁸ The simple fact that the empirical validity of the concept of robust peacekeeping relies heavily on the experience of the Congo, Bosnia, and Somalia, should lead to a more cautious position regarding the validity of the doctrine. One should not be overzealous in unequivocally asserting the validity and usefulness of a doctrine so recently developed and based on relatively few cases.

Yet, there may be room for a second means to validate the principles of the emerging consensus beyond drawing on the lessons of recent, post-Cold War interventions. Thomas R. Mockaitis has suggested that there is a linkage between peace support operations in the “grey area” between consent-based peacekeeping and traditional enforcement, and counterinsurgency operations during the Cold War, campaigns where western governments attempted to defend states against subversion and insurgencies conducted by predominantly communist guerillas attempting to overthrow the government of the threatened state.⁹ He suggests that “intervention to end civil conflict more closely resembles counterinsurgency than it does any other form of military activity.”¹⁰ Recognizing this linkage, he suggests that the current practice of peace support operations can be informed by the experience of British counterinsurgency during the post-World War Two period.¹¹ The British approach to counterinsurgency is specifically singled out because Britain developed an elaborate and distinct approach to combating insurgencies and achieved greater levels of success than any other

state during the period.¹² The British experience is therefore in a privileged position to inform the current practice of peace operations.¹³

In order to evaluate the validity of the new and recently asserted consensus on peace operations in the “grey zone,” and to make recommendations regarding the further development of doctrine to guide such interventions, this essay examines main principles of British counterinsurgency doctrine that are relevant to the conduct of peace operations and evaluates the content of the “consensus” in relation to the principles of the British approach. The first section of the paper elaborates the relevant principles, drawing primarily upon two principal sources, Sir Robert Thompson’s *Defeating Communist Insurgency* and Frank Kitson’s, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping*.¹⁴

The second section of the paper examines the basis of the linkage between counterinsurgency and contemporary “grey area” peace operations. The linkage between the two, seemingly conceptually distinct forms of activity, rests upon two main similarities: the complex nature of the problem each type of operation confronts, and the nature of the operational environment within which such operations take place.¹⁵ The strength of the similarity between the two types of operations validates the basic methodology utilized in the following analysis.¹⁶

The third section of the paper examines the content of current peace operations doctrine for operations in the “grey zone” compared to the principles outlined in the first section. Overall, the emerging consensus is largely consistent with the principles derived from the British approach to counterinsurgency, suggesting that the evolution of doctrine has been in the right direction. However, the fact that many of the principles have not yet been fully adopted or incorporated suggests that there is still much work to be done in developing doctrine to guide such operations. Thus, there remains space for the experience of counterinsurgency to guide further doctrinal developments. The fourth section elaborates specific recommendations for the development of peace operations doctrine drawn from the principles of British counterinsurgency. The final section

summarizes briefly and suggests that the experience of counterinsurgency can provide a consistent framework to guide further developments in peacekeeping doctrine.

Principles of the British Approach **A Comprehensive Plan and A Clear Overall Objective**

Perhaps the cardinal feature of the British approach to counterinsurgency, elaborated by both Kitson and Thompson, is the recognition of the need for a comprehensive plan and a clear overall objective that can guide the actions of all actors within the conflict zone. Robert Thompson presents five primary principles to guide counterinsurgency operations. Significantly, the first principle he elaborates is the need for a clear political aim. He suggests that this aim should be “to establish and maintain a free, independent and unified country which is politically and economically stable and viable.”¹⁷

The idea of establishing legitimate government and good governance plays a key role in British counterinsurgency doctrine. The focus of the plan must be to gain control of the population and to win its support. This is what is commonly referred to as a “hearts and minds” approach to counterinsurgency. The focus is not upon defeating the insurgency militarily, but upon restoring law and order as well as government authority.¹⁸ In order to do this effectively, the popular support of the population is the key factor.¹⁹ Indeed, Kitson conceives of the campaign as essentially a battle for the support of the population: “It is this interplay of operations designed by both sides to secure the support of the population and at the same time to damage their opponents, that constitutes a subversive campaign.”²⁰

Within the British approach there is an explicit recognition of the root causes of the conflict that reach beyond the purely military nature of the conflict. The military aspect of the problem cannot be treated in isolation from the other underlying causes of the conflict. Kitson makes this clear. He recognizes that legitimate grievances underlie the conflict and must be rectified as part of the counterinsurgency campaign, especially those that are exploited by the insurgents.²¹ Thompson uses

this idea to defend the broad nature of the overall goal he proposes, focusing on creating political and economic stability.²²

It is also recognized that in order to restore law and order, as well as government legitimacy, one must focus on building a reliable government administration focusing on institution building and the training of personnel.²³ Indeed, government weakness and poor administration actually aid the insurgents and contribute to the continuation of the conflict. Thus Thompson suggests,

The correction of these weaknesses is as much a part of counterinsurgency as any military operation. In fact, it is far more important because unless the cracks in the government structure are mended, military operations and emergency measures, apart from being ineffectual, may themselves widen the cracks and be turned to the enemy's advantage.²⁴

Flowing from the recognition of the importance of confronting the root causes of the conflict and the establishment of good governance as the overall objective, is the idea that the overall plan must combine both civil and military tasks and operations. The plan must be comprehensive. Kitson suggests that this combination of civil and military tasks is essential due to the nature of the conflict whereby the insurgents are likely to employ a range of tactics combining political, economic, psychological and military measures.²⁵ Thompson also notes the importance of a comprehensive plan incorporating military and security measures as well as "all political, social, economic, administrative, police and other measures which have a bearing on the insurgency."²⁶ It is clear that counterinsurgency is a complex problem that requires a complex and comprehensive solution, combining both negative and positive inducements with the overall aim of winning the support of the population. Thus, as Mockaitis notes, "quashing rebellion requires a judicious application of incentives and punishments to win the loyalty of the disaffected population."²⁷

Thus, it is clear that force and military measures on their own will be insufficient to achieve a lasting solution; they will not resolve the underlying causes of the conflict. As Thompson notes, "It is just possible that force might achieve a temporary victory; but it would leave almost every single internal problem unresolved."²⁸ Thus, the achievement of the overall goal of establishing a viable

and stable political and economic environment is dependant upon the application of additional means beyond the use of force.²⁹ Force and coercive measures may be used to gain control and establish security but beyond that more positive inducements must be utilized to gain the allegiance of the population.

Moreover, faced with such a complex task it is essential that the roles and responsibilities of all actors are well defined to ensure that there is no duplication of effort or gaps in the strategy pursued against the insurgency.³⁰ In order to do this effectively it is essential to have a unified planning process bringing together all actors within the system. Kitson suggests “No matter how well aware of the problem the authorities are, they will only be able to solve it if they can devise machinery at every level which can assess all the factors, whether they are operational or administrative, short-term or long-term, make a plan and put it into effect.”³¹ Due to the interdependence of the tasks required to be fulfilled, it is essential that such a unified planning process takes place. If no unified plan is developed, there is an increased chance of measures interfering with each other or acting in isolation, affecting the achievement of overall success.³² Kitson points to this danger explicitly, noting consultations at the planning state must include “all concerned government departments and identify all operational implications both civil and military before the start of the operation.” He warns that “Unless this is done, policy on matters important to the outcome of the struggle will just grow up as opposed to being decided on consciously in light of all of the relevant factors.”³³

Thompson builds on the importance of coordinated planning noting the importance of coordinating military and civilian action.³⁴ Similarly, he also suggests that military operations must be planned in coordination with civilian activities following the military operations to achieve lasting success.³⁵ It is clear that efforts enacted in isolation from other aspects of the overall strategy are limited in their effect and must be actively discouraged, and that the development of the plan must incorporate all aspects of the problem and include contributions from military and civilian actors. Moreover, such a planning process must consistently focus upon the long-term goal of the campaign and resist the

tendency to adopt short-term reactive measures applied in an ad hoc and uncoordinated fashion, with little consideration of their long-term implications.³⁶ Indeed, the importance of civil-military cooperation is so great, especially beyond the planning stage where initiatives are actively being implemented, that civil-military cooperation is a principle of the British approach to counterinsurgency itself.³⁷

Civil-Military Cooperation

Mockaitis describes civil-military cooperation as a broad principle of the British approach to counterinsurgency.³⁸ He describes how the British developed a committee-based structure to facilitate civil-military cooperation from the local level to the national level. The approach is described as being “bottom-up,” in that it starts with cooperation at the local level, forcing soldiers to “adapt to the needs of the civilians on the ground.”³⁹

Thompson is a clear advocate of this style of approach. He suggests that committee structures incorporating all relevant actors be utilized at the national and local levels to ensure coordination. The committee at the national level also has the responsibility to develop clear plans and policy, as noted in the previous section. The various policies created are then implemented by the various departments and headquarters involved, with regular committee meetings at the local level to ensure coordination amongst the local actors. He clearly differentiates between coordination and command, noting that the committees do not override normal command procedures within the organizations involved, military or civil, and only serve a coordinating function.⁴⁰

British doctrine also suggests the use of an overall Director of Operations with a coordinating role responsible for all military and civil operations.⁴¹ Such a Director was utilized in Malaya when General Templer was appointed overall high commissioner and director of operations, combining the civil and military commands at the highest level.⁴² The Director of operations can assist in the resolution of any disputes that arise surrounding the implementation of policy at each level.⁴³

Within the literature there is an understanding that coordination of the various actors is a daunting task that is further complicated by complex command and organizational structures of the various actors and when a multinational force is involved. This is perhaps most clearly commented upon by Kitson. He suggests that in order to counter these complicating factors, a common understanding of the coordinating system should be fostered.⁴⁴ He builds on this idea noting that common training for advisors in a multinational context despite their specific and specialized roles should be adopted so that the advisors “all understand the system as a whole, as well as their own place in it.”⁴⁵ Kitson stresses a similar point within a discussion of the need for common military doctrine among the various national contingents of a multinational force. A common understanding of the doctrine in use is essential if operational success is to be achieved.⁴⁶ One does not have to stretch these comments very far to see the implications for contemporary peace operations.

Minimum Force

The use of minimum force is the first broad principle outlined by Mockaitis. He suggests that this principle emerged as a result of British colonial administrators being bound by the common law principle of minimum force and the legal concept of “aid to the civil power” that governed the administration’s response to situations of unrest.⁴⁷ According to the doctrine the military’s task was “not the annihilation of the enemy, but merely the suppression of a temporary disorder, and therefore the degree of force to be employed must be directed to that which is essential to restore order and must never exceed it.”⁴⁸

The British Pamphlet, *Keeping the Peace (Duties in Support of the Civil Power)*, clearly laid out four conditions which govern the use of force under the principle of minimum force. First, there must be a necessity and justification for each separate act. Second, the use must be preventive and not punitive; there must be a reason for using military force. Third, no more force should be used than is necessary to achieve the minimum aim. Fourth, members of the military must act impartially and calmly at all time and their actions must comply strictly with the law.⁴⁹ Under the minimum

force criteria force is not an end in itself but must serve a wider purpose. The focus in determining whether or not to use force is upon how the use of force contributes to the achievement of the desired outcome; how it achieves its instrumental purpose.⁵⁰

Kitson supports the principle of minimum force noting especially the negative affect the use of excess force can have, driving the population away from the government towards the extremist opposition.⁵¹ Yet he also recognizes that the use of force may be beneficial in the pursuit of the wider goal of the “hearts and minds” campaign, to win the support of the population. He suggests that some amount of force can be utilized as a means to create conditions where the population is “reasonably uncomfortable” in order to provide them with an incentive to return to normal life, and to act as a deterrent against the resumption of the subversive campaign.⁵² In the former case, force is utilized in order to restore order and achieve breathing space where more positive inducements and concessions can have an effect.⁵³ Regarding the latter purpose of the use of force, Kitson recognizes the military may have an incentive to cultivate a reputation suggesting an ever-present threat of the use of force in order to contain the situation and deter challenges. Thus, he suggests that,

However great the restrictions imposed on the use of force by soldiers, every effort should be made to retain the respect and awe of the civilian community for the ultimate in terms of force which they might use. If an impression can be built up that although the troops have used little force so far, they might at any moment use a great deal more, the people will be wary and relatively fewer men will be needed.⁵⁴

A point of caution is noted, however. Kitson recognizes that an element of bluffing, and therefore risk, is involved in this process.⁵⁵ However the benefits of cultivating such a reputation are significant, in terms of maintaining order and requiring fewer resources to do so.

Kitson also posits that the amount of force utilized within the framework of the counterinsurgency campaign is dependent upon the nature of the opposing threat. He suggests that when the forces are confronted by a situation of civil disorder and terrorism, especially in urban areas, as opposed to a full-scale insurgency where actual insurgent forces are conducting traditional military operations, the level of force utilized will necessarily change. In the latter case, a heightened level of force will be

used, focused upon destroying the insurgent forces. In the former case the operational emphasis is upon “divorcing extremist elements from the population which they are trying to subvert.”⁵⁶ In achieving this aim the focus on the use of offensive armed force gives way to a greater focus on persuasion, although offensive use of armed force is still be required.⁵⁷ The greater focus on persuasion increases the role played by information operations and psychological warfare in counterinsurgency operations, while maintaining the key role to be played by intelligence gathering in both operational contexts.⁵⁸ It is to these areas that the discussion now turns.

The Need for Intelligence

Both Kitson and Thompson strongly advise that intelligence plays a key role in guiding operations in counterinsurgency operations. Kitson even goes so far as to suggest that good information is of paramount importance.⁵⁹ Thompson suggests that, because subversion and insurgency are carried out ultimately by individuals, the aim of intelligence gathering in the counterinsurgency context is to identify those individuals who pose a threat to the security of the country. This facilitates the elimination of the threat and the prevention of illegal actions.⁶⁰

Kitson agrees that the key role of intelligence is to identify threats to security in order to allow action. Yet, he notes that in counterinsurgency situations identifying threats is often a difficult task due to the fact that the insurgents often strike and then hide amongst the population, relying upon anonymity for security.⁶¹ Kitson makes a related observation that the intelligence that is gathered often does not lead to direct contacts, but must be analyzed and developed from its original form to guide operations. He makes the distinction between the intelligence that is first gathered, which he calls “background information,” which is often of a very general nature, and the modified intelligence that can effectively guide operations; what he calls “contact information.”⁶² Kitson elaborates on the process by which background information is developed into contact information. He describes an ongoing process of information collection from numerous sources, including all actors in the campaign, and from the results of all activities undertaken, combined with an ongoing

process of analysis gradually and systematically leading to the successful identification of the threat and its location. He describes the process as being a snowball effect culminating in the prospect of a successful operation.⁶³ He notes however, that the chain of information gathering and analysis leading to a successful contact is tenuous and easily broken, requiring the whole process to begin again.⁶⁴ He suggests that this realization reinforces the need for a systematic approach to information collection and analysis, in order to achieve long-term success.⁶⁵ Only a systematic approach can lead to long-term success and a reduction in the security threat by eliminating the insurgent's organization and infrastructure.

Kitson also recommends the rapid-deployment of an effective intelligence capability that can guide operations through the early stages of a campaign. He argues that "insurgents are particularly vulnerable in the early stages of a campaign because at that time they have not perfected their security measures and may not have cajoled or terrorized more than a relatively small proportion of the population into supporting them." An effective intelligence capability, present early in the campaign, would increase the ability of the counterinsurgent forces to conduct effective operations and capitalize on the vulnerability of the insurgents perhaps having a decisive impact on both the outcome and duration of the campaign; potentially decreasing the length of time needed to achieve a government victory.⁶⁶

Both theorists also suggest that intelligence gathering cannot be separated from the wider activities undertaken in the civil, non-military aspects of the campaign. There is a clear linkage between the intelligence gathering aspect of the campaign and the wider efforts designed to win the "hearts and minds" of the population. The attitude of the population is key in the provision of intelligence information. Kitson makes this relationship absolutely clear while pointing to the importance of efforts to maintain security:

All actions designed to retain and regain the allegiance of the population are relevant to the process of collecting background information because its provision is closely geared to the attitude of the people. In other words the whole national programme of civil military action

bears on the problem... The operational responsibilities of a commander or committee at a local level, e.g. Province or District, for the collection of background information are usually concerned with affording a measure of security to the loyal and uncommitted sections of the population...⁶⁷

Moreover, Kitson also suggests that civic-action programs can have a direct effect upon the population's perception of a secure environment.⁶⁸ Thompson builds on the importance of the population's perceptions. He notes how the creation of a perception whereby the population feels they have a stake in the maintenance of stability and hope for the future encourages the population "to take the necessary positive action to prevent insurgent reinfiltration and to provide the necessary information to eradicate any insurgent cells that remain."⁶⁹ Thus, winning the battle "for the hearts and minds" of the population reinforces intelligence success. The significance of the population's perceptions is directly related to the importance of an information campaign in counterinsurgency operations; the topic discussed in the following section.

The Primary Importance of Information Operations

Just as both theorists advocate the primary role for intelligence operations in counterinsurgency both stress the need for a coordinated and integrated effort to win the support of the population. It is recognized that the nature of the conflict, that the ultimate goal is to win the support of the population, suggests that the insurgents will use propaganda as a means to attract the population to their side. In order to counter insurgent propaganda the government must conduct an information campaign that presents the government program in an attractive fashion.⁷⁰ The campaign is essential to maintaining the initiative on the side of the government.⁷¹

Thompson specifies that the campaign should publicize all government policies and the reasons underlying their institution, and stress government successes without overstating the facts. He is adamant that the government information services should avoid propagandizing the message and focus on conveying factual information in a confident tone without overstating the facts.⁷² Otherwise the credibility of the government, "the most precious propaganda asset of the government," could be

undermined, and the government's message ineffectual.⁷³ He also makes it clear that the campaign requires close coordination between those responsible for its implementation and the agencies or departments responsible for the implementation of government programs.⁷⁴

The information campaign can also make it easier to implement more coercive measures, thus supporting the use of both positive and negative inducements in the wider campaign. Thompson makes this point when he notes that implementing tough measures, particularly in the security domain, is made much easier when "the foundation of the government approach and the basis of its policy appeal to the peasant have been made clear."⁷⁵

Kitson also makes several recommendations to guide the operation of the information campaign. He suggests that the campaign must structure its messages to suit the local context. In this respect, local input at the planning stage is essential to ensure that the message is not misunderstood by the population. He also recommends that, like an intelligence capability, an information operations capability should be rapidly set up at the beginning of a campaign warning that "there must be no delay."⁷⁶ Moreover he suggests that the military, due to its resource advantage in the communications field, may be well-suited to this role.⁷⁷

A Long-Term, Long-Haul Approach

The British approach was characterized by the British themselves as a "low-cost, long haul approach" because it often took years to achieve the desired aim.⁷⁸ This principle is directly connected to the wider focus of the British strategy on resolving the underlying sources of the conflict to prevent its recurrence and to foster an environment of peace and stability. It is also connected to the nature of the British approach focusing on winning the support of the population. In such a contest, impressions of government confidence and determination are key.⁷⁹ Building on this idea Thompson suggests that the government adopt a steamroller approach, securing priority areas first and then moving methodically out from that point, that fosters an impression of the government's confidence and determination to win.⁸⁰ This may foster a perception of ultimate

government victory within the population. Thus, “by preparing for a long-haul, the government may achieve victory quicker than expected.”⁸¹ The danger of the opposite approach is clear. If a lack of confidence or determination is reflected either by word or action, the governments cause can be weakened and popular support lost.⁸²

The Linkage Between Counterinsurgency and “Grey Area” Peace Operations: Mission Complexity and the Operational Environment

At first glance, one would probably object to any link being drawn between counterinsurgency doctrine and that guiding contemporary peace operations. Indeed, Mockaitis acknowledges that the comparison may “raise eyebrows”, due to the illiberal connotation that sometimes marks counterinsurgency in part due to its colonial origins and the seeming antithetical nature of the two forms of activity; counterinsurgency being where a threatened government had to defend against an internal revolt against its authority, and peace operations that presuppose “a neutral international force intervening to separate the belligerents in a conflict.”⁸³ Indeed, no notion of neutrality or impartiality is recognized within the counterinsurgency literature. However, once one looks beyond the historical context within which counterinsurgency developed, two strong similarities between the two seemingly conceptually distinct types of operation are revealed.

The first relates to the nature of the problem confronted in contemporary peace operations in an intrastate context. The locale of such operations is predominantly within failed or failing states, characterized by a collapse of civil infrastructure, the absence of law and order, large numbers of refugees and displaced people, and high levels of human deprivation and suffering.⁸⁴ Thus, in this context, the solution to the problem must be comprehensive encompassing not only military action but economic, social, and political action as well. This has necessitated a proliferation of actors within peace operations, which now include greater numbers of non-military personnel, including police, humanitarian aid workers, and representatives from international organizations, and placed an increasing emphasis on the need to coordinate planning and operations conducted by each of the

agencies and actors within the conflict zone. The similarity between the response required to deal effectively with contemporary failed states and that outlined in the British approach to counterinsurgency is striking; both call for an integrated effort combining civil and military action to counter all aspects of a complex and multidimensional problem that cannot be solved through military action alone. Thus, essentially, the two types of operation are working from the same central premise.

The second similarity between the two operations is related to the nature of the operational environment that characterizes both forms of activity.⁸⁵ In each case, the operational environment is complex and ambiguous, both in terms of the geographical area of operations, which lacks clear boundaries or front-lines and in terms of the nature of belligerent parties. Indeed, both types of operation are characterized by conflict involving both regular and paramilitary forces operating within difficult rural or urban terrain that often utilize the population as a means of concealment and pursue their military objective using guerilla or insurgent tactics.⁸⁶ In each case it is difficult to identify the belligerents who may lack formal command and control hierarchies. This often results in the population being targeted directly,⁸⁷ and places a premium on intelligence gathering for the successful guidance of operations. In many cases the belligerents also utilize terror tactics to either enforce compliance amongst their own population or to intimidate their opponents, and also utilize propaganda as a means to increase support for their cause, both within the conflict area and internationally.

The similarity between the operational environment and the nature of the problems characteristic of the two types of operations, has resulted in a convergence between the developing principles guiding peace operations in such an environment and those of counterinsurgency. This similarity is reflected in the suggestion made by Sens, that control of the population, a key objective in the British approach to counterinsurgency, will become a key objective of future peace operations conducted in such an operational environment.⁸⁸ This convergence is also reflected in the strong similarity

between the principles common to the recently developed doctrine for peace operations and the principles of the British approach to counterinsurgency; the subject of the following section.

The Consensus: A Reflection of the British Principles?

Peter Viggo Jakobsen has recognized that the “doctrinal fog” that characterized the debate surrounding the evolution of peace operations doctrine has lifted through the emergence of a consensus in the doctrine of western states surrounding “grey zone” operations. He summarizes the principles of the consensus in the following passage:

The consensus provides a straightforward answer to the problem created by limited consent: when in doubt deploy a force capable of using both carrots and sticks to promote consent, deter non-compliance and, if necessary, enforce compliance. Negotiation and a wide variety of consent-promoting techniques, including rewards for cooperation, must be employed to generate trust and cooperation from the local population, and force is only to be used as a last resort in a discriminate and proportionate manner against parties threatening the civilian population or preventing the peace force from achieving its mandate. The objective is not to defeat one or more of the parties to the conflict but to create the conditions for a stable peace settlement.⁸⁹

One can clearly see many reflections of the British counterinsurgency approach within the “consensus” approach. The approach utilizes a combination of positive and negative inducements to promote consent, trust and cooperation within the local population and specifically calls for cooperation to be rewarded. This was in effect the hallmark of the British approach to counterinsurgency focused on winning the “hearts and minds” of the population.

The consensus also recognizes that the use of force ideally is kept to a minimum and only used as a last resort against those posing security threats or obstructing the achievement of the mandate. This clearly reflects the minimum force approach of British counterinsurgency. Force is used when necessary in a discriminate and proportional manner to remove a specific threat, as called for according to the minimum force precept that guided counterinsurgency operations. Indeed the British doctrine elaborated in Joint Warfare Publication 3-50, the current British doctrine for peace support operations, elaborates the minimum use of force specifically as one of the three primary principles of the doctrine.⁹⁰ The recognition that force may be required against specific targets that

pose a security threat or an impediment to the implementation of the mandate also reflects the British approach to counterinsurgency that posited that offensive action would be required in both full-scale insurgency but also when confronting situations of civil disorder and terrorist actions where the action would be of a lesser scale, directed at “divorcing extremist elements from the population which they are trying to subvert.”⁹¹

While the consensus approach supports the principle of the minimum use of force the deterrent effect of a credible coercive capacity is also a main theme. This reflects the idea, presented by Kitson above, that a strong military force can actually deter action by groups or individuals that would undermine the security environment. Thus, just as the British counterinsurgency approach balanced the minimum use of force principle with the benefits of a credible coercive threat of the use of military force, the current consensus seeks to balance the same principles.

The consensus identifies fostering the conditions conducive to a stable peace settlement as the main objective of the peace force. Elaborating this focus, the current British doctrine specifically mentions that one practical activity that must be undertaken is the “identification of the underlying causes and symptoms of the problem so as to facilitate reconstruction and longer-term settlement.”⁹² The similarity between this approach and the British counterinsurgency doctrine premised upon the mitigation of the underlying sources of conflict is clear. Moreover, the British doctrine also specifies that the role of the military contingent as “essentially creating the necessary security conditions so that the efforts of civilian counterparts can bear fruit.”⁹³ There is a clear recognition that military measures cannot achieve success in isolation;⁹⁴ perhaps the fundamental principle underlying the British counterinsurgency approach. This also clearly reflects the role played by military forces in British counterinsurgency approach whereby the military force would create the “breathing space” within which the wider civilian efforts could be conducted.

The strength of the links between the new consensus and the principles of British counterinsurgency are strengthened by the recognition among the countries developing the new

doctrine that improvements in three specific areas are crucial to enhancing the prospects for success. These three areas are: civil military cooperation, “creating an effective partnership with civilian agencies and NGO’s based on mutual respect and coordination by consensus and not command”; consent promotion, including information campaigns and other efforts to win the “hearts and minds” of the local population; and intelligence, specifically the “ability to gather, analyse and disseminate intelligence data quickly.”⁹⁵ Significantly, these three areas where improvements are considered to be required reflect three main principles of the British approach, civil-military cooperation, and the essential role of intelligence gathering and the information campaign in countering internal threats.⁹⁶ The recognition of this fact emphasizes the strength of the convergence between peace operations doctrine and the principles of counterinsurgency, reinforcing the ability of counterinsurgency to inform current doctrine.

What are the implications of the linkage for an evaluation of the current consensus? The similarity between the emerging consensus and the principles of the British approach suggests the evolution of doctrine has been in the right direction. However, the fact that many of the principles have not yet been fully adopted or incorporated suggests that there is still much work to be done further developing doctrine to guide such operations. Thus, there remains space for the experience of British counterinsurgency to guide further doctrinal developments.

Key Recommendations for the Development of Contemporary Doctrine

The overview of British counterinsurgency principles conducted above suggests the following recommendations for the development of peace operations doctrine.⁹⁷ First, the provision of an information operations capability must be incorporated into the structure of “grey area” peace operations.⁹⁸ To be effective, the operation of this capability should be shaped by the local context and environment. Furthermore, emphasis must be placed upon the rapid deployment of an effective capability to ensure this vital role is filled in the crucial early stages of the operation.⁹⁹

Second, peace operations must include a systematic approach to information collection and analysis in order to provide the required intelligence to guide offensive operations against security threats.¹⁰⁰ Furthermore, Kitson's work suggests that quality analysis of the information collected is essential if it is to be useful in guiding operations; the focus must of intelligence operations in peace operations must therefore be as much upon analyzing the information collected as upon the collection of the information itself. Moreover, intelligence should be collected by all actors within the conflict zone including police, military, and non-governmental organizations.¹⁰¹ The use of a committee structure, as utilized in British counterinsurgency, would allow for the effective coordination of the intelligence side of the operation and facilitate dissemination and joint analysis of the information collected.¹⁰² The linkage between civilian peacebuilding initiatives, the attitude of the population, and their willingness to provide intelligence information, also supports the suggestion that mission budgets should allow for "quick-impact" projects in the initial stages of the operation.¹⁰³ Such projects could lead to the provision of good intelligence information early in the mission laying a foundation for operational success.

Third, effective civil-military cooperation must be coordinated at all levels from the local to the national level. Recent missions including Bosnia and Kosovo, have shown that coordination among national military contingents as well as between civil and military actors, particularly at the local level, has not been sufficiently coordinated or ensured that the actions taken have reflected an overall plan.¹⁰⁴ The British committee structure could be implemented to ensure coordination among the various actors at both the national and local levels.¹⁰⁵ The appointment of a director of operations, perhaps in the person of the Special Representative of the Secretary General in UN operations, to facilitate coordination of mission components would also be a positive development.

Fourth, building on the need for effective civil-military cooperation, mission planning should be conducted in advance and incorporate as many of the mission components, civilian and military, as possible, to ensure an integrated approach. Such coordinated planning would be likely to foster a

common understanding of major issues, and facilitate the establishment of clearly defined roles and responsibilities to combat duplication of effort.¹⁰⁶

Lastly, peace operations doctrine should define the establishment of good governance as the overall mission objective.¹⁰⁷ The creation of legitimate government through winning the “hearts and minds of the population” was the overall goal of British counterinsurgency doctrine elaborated by Thompson and Kitson. Current doctrine establishes the rather vague notion of the creation of a stable peace settlement as the overall mission objective. The proposed objective is superior in that it defines more precisely the end-state envisioned as the overall goal of the intervention. Redefining the end-state in this manner would also likely entail recognition that a “long-haul” approach is required to fulfill this overall objective.

Conclusion: The Way Forward – “Back to the Future?”

These recommendations are merely the principal lessons that can be drawn from the British experience in counterinsurgency. Given the necessity of the further evolution of peace operations doctrine,¹⁰⁸ the potential to draw lessons from the British counterinsurgency experience should not be overlooked. The strong similarity between the characteristics of the operational environment and the complex nature of the problem confronted in contemporary “grey area” operations to those encountered in previous counterinsurgency campaigns allows lessons learned in the latter to be applied to the former. The fact that many of the recommendations currently being made mirror the lessons derived from the British approach to counterinsurgency reinforces the strength of this conclusion, and suggests that British counterinsurgency doctrine may be able to act as an overall framework to guide the continuing evolution of peace operations doctrine. Indeed, utilizing the British approach to counterinsurgency as a starting-point would base the developing doctrine on a solid-foundation of hard-won experience, reflected in principles that proved successful in a similar endeavor. The way forward may well be ‘back to the future’.

However a word of caution is in order. While the doctrinal void identified by Ruggie is being filled, and a viable doctrine to guide “grey zone” operations is currently developing, the experience of counterinsurgency also suggests that the complexity and difficulty of operating in this type of operational environment should not be underestimated. The history of counterinsurgency is both one of failures as well as victories, and in many cases the final outcome took years to be determined. Decision-makers should bear this in mind when evaluating options for conflict management – the current doctrine is no silver-bullet. It may be prudent to reiterate Thompson’s assertion of the three “indispensable” qualities in counterinsurgency: patience, determination, and offensive spirit tempered by discretion. As he suggests there are “no-short cuts and no gimmicks” in conducting this type of operation.¹⁰⁹ Preparing for “grey area” operations is likely to necessitate preparing for the long-haul. Developing doctrine may guide the conduct of operations, yet it cannot assure the requisite will and determination necessary to ensure its successful implementation. However, basing that doctrine on a sound foundation of established principles drawn from counterinsurgency as well as more recent lessons learned from contemporary operations may foster an environment conducive to the production of the will necessary to see it applied successfully; it may even enhance its development.

Notes

¹ The Brahimi report makes this clear, noting that post-Cold War missions tended to deploy “where conflict had not resulted in victory for any side, where a military stalemate or international pressure or both had brought fighting to a halt but at least some of the parties to the conflict were not seriously committed to ending the confrontation. United Nations operations did thus did not deploy into post-conflict situations but tried to create them.” See, United Nations, Report of the Panel on Peace Operations, 2000, viii.

² Thomas R. Mockaitis summarizes this perception when he notes that the “inescapable conclusion to be drawn from recent missions is, of course, that intervention in an active civil war is not peacekeeping” and that applying the principles of traditional peacekeeping to such operations “leads to disaster.” See, Thomas R. Mockaitis, *Peace Operations and Intrastate Conflict: The Sword or the Olive Branch*, (Westport Conn: Praeger, 1999), 127. John Ruggie also elaborated this idea while making an argument for a doctrine between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, when he stated that “It is in the gray area between peacekeeping and all-out war-fighting that the UN has gotten itself into serious trouble. The trouble stems from the fact that the United Nations has misapplied perfectly good tools to inappropriate circumstances.” See, John Gerrard Ruggie, “Wandering in the Void: Charting the UN’s New Strategic Role,” *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 4 (November/December 1993): 28.

³ For examples of this line of thought see, Alan James, “Peacekeeping and Ethnic Conflict: Theory and Evidence,” in David Carment and Patrick James eds., *Peace in the Midst of Wars* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), 163-193; Stuart Kauffman, “Preventing Ethnic Violence: Conditions for the Success of Peacekeeping, in David Carment and Patrick James eds., *Peace in the Midst of Wars* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), 194-229. A main implication of this argument is that intervention should be applied where prospects for success are evident, and that where such conditions are not apparent no intervention should be launched. In the words of Stuart Kauffman, “If any party is determined to continue to fight, the best that peacekeepers can do is stay away.” See Kauffman, “Preventing Ethnic Violence,” 224.

⁴ Ruggie argued that “the United Nations has entered a domain of military activity – a vaguely defined no-man’s-land lying somewhere between traditional peacekeeping and enforcement – for which it lacks any guiding operational concept.” See, Ruggie, 26. This call for new doctrine was echoed by Adam Roberts who identified a “need to recognize that occasionally there is a need for, and a possibility of, an approach which is conceptually distinct both from impartial peacekeeping based on consent of the parties and from simple enforcement action on behalf of an attacked state.” See, Adam Roberts, “From San Francisco to Sarajevo: The UN and the Use of Force,” *Survival* 37, no. 4 (Winter 1995-96): 26.

⁵ See, Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “The Emerging Consensus on Grey Area Peace Operations Doctrine: Will it Last and Enhance Operational Effectiveness?” *International Peacekeeping* 7, no. 3 (Autumn 2000): 36-56; Woodhouse also notes the development of such doctrine, “a framework for a new doctrine of peacekeeping is emerging which presents a model of peacekeeping more robust than the classic model, but which retains the crucial distinction between peacekeeping and war fighting or peace enforcement.” See, Tom Woodhouse, “The Gentle Hand of Peace? British Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution in Complex Political Emergencies”, *International Peacekeeping* 6, no. 2, (Summer 1999): 24. The UN in the Brahimi report has also affirmed the concept of robust peacekeeping, suggesting that more assertive forms of intervention can be utilized to mitigate ongoing conflicts.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 45.

⁷ The primary mission during the Cold War that operated in similar circumstances was the UN mission in the Congo. See, Mockaitis, *Peace Operations*, 6.

⁸ See Jakobsen, 42.

⁹ Prominent examples of counterinsurgency campaigns include the British experience in Malaya and Northern Ireland and the U.S. experience in Vietnam.

¹⁰ Mockaitis, *Peace Operations*, 7.

¹¹ Mockaitis suggests that Britain’s counterinsurgency experience can be added to the cases of peace operations in the grey area to inform current practice. *Ibid.*, 141. See also, Thomas Mockaitis, “Civil Conflict Intervention: Peacekeeping or Enforcement,” in *Peacekeeping with Muscle: The Use of Force in International Conflict Resolution*, eds. Alex Morrison, Douglas A. Fraser and James D. Kiras (Clementsport NS: Canadian

Peacekeeping Press, 1997): 47-48. Richard Lovelock echoes the call for lessons from past counterinsurgency experience to inform current practice. He states that the Kosovo experience suggests that the comprehensive nature (that it included a fusion of civil and military actors) of the British counterinsurgency approach is “fundamental to contemporary peace support operations.” See, Richard Lovelock, “The Evolution of Peace Operations Doctrine,” *Joint Force Quarterly* (Spring 2002): 71.

¹² According to Mockaitis, “only the United Kingdom has enjoyed any sustained success at defeating insurgencies.” See, *Peace Operations*, 132-33.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 132. Allen G. Sens also recognizes the British expertise in this form of conflict and notes that their expertise developed amongst a wider complacency towards developing doctrine to guide action in “unconventional wars.” See, Sens, *Somalia and the Changing Nature of Peacekeeping: The Implications for Canada*, (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997), 28, note 6. He notes specifically that the United States tended to ignore the importance of insurgency warfare, “Despite the prominence of several insurgency wars during the Cold War period, the ability to combat insurgencies was not considered a military priority, especially in the United States.” He continues to suggest that this lack of focus on counterinsurgency had a potentially negative impact on the ability of Western militaries to conduct peace operations in the low-intensity conflicts of the post-Cold War period, thus reinforcing the linkage between counterinsurgency practice and the conduct of contemporary peace operations. He states that “as a result, western militaries... were slow to develop the military expertise or the requisite fusion of political social, and military strategy that could have been so helpful for intervention (and peacekeeping) in the internal low-intensity conflicts of the immediate post-Cold War period.” *Ibid.*, 28.

¹⁴ Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-keeping* (London: Faber and Faber, 1971); Sir Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam* (New York: Praeger, 1966). This methodology is sound due to the significant impact these two authors had upon the subsequent development of British doctrine. Mockaitis asserts that the “Official literature of counterinsurgency since the mid-1970s has been heavily influenced by the work of Robert Thompson and particularly Frank Kitson”, and suggests that these two works are still required reading within the subject. These two works therefore can be understood as elaborating the broad principles of the British approach. An analysis of Mockaitis’ work, which examines the nature of the British approach, and the content of the two works supports this statement. Both works reflect the general principles Mockaitis elaborates in his works.

¹⁵ This includes the nature of the belligerents active within that operational environment.

¹⁶ This section also acknowledges some differences between the two types of operations. However, these differences are not sufficient to endanger the ability of past counterinsurgency experience to inform current peace operations practice or to evaluate the content of contemporary doctrine.

¹⁷ Thompson, 50.

¹⁸ Thompson expresses these aims as overall goals, 51.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 51.

²⁰ Kitson, 48.

²¹ Kitson, 51.

²² He states that, “It may be contended that this is rather too broad, if desirable an aim; but in newly independent or underdeveloped territories it is essential to recognize that an insurgent movement is only one of the problems with which such governments are faced. The insurgency may demand priority, but it cannot be treated in isolation.” See, Thompson, 51.

²³ *Ibid.*, 51.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 52.

²⁵ Kitson states that the “enemy is likely to be employing a combination of political, economic, psychological and military measures, so the government will have to do likewise to defeat him.” Kitson, 7.

²⁶ Thompson, 55.

²⁷ Mockaitis, *Peace Operations*, 130. Thompson as well, goes into some detail on this point, elaborating the importance of establishing an environment of security for the population while noting that establishing security alone is not sufficient to win the support of the population. He suggests that establishing security is merely the first step. The second is to win over the population through the application of positive inducements that are clearly shown to be a consequence of security. Thompson states that “Security by itself is not enough to make

the peasant willing to choose to support the government. Without it he cannot, even with it he may not. The next step is to influence his choice, which must still remain a free choice. He can only be made to support the government if the government can show him that what it has to offer is something better than the insurgent can offer him. The importance of improving the standard of living of the peasants socially, politically, economically and culturally has already been stressed... It is important to get across that the benefits are a reward and a consequence of security, not a bribe. They serve as an example of what can be achieved when peace is restored.” Thompson, 143. This quote also indicates the importance of a public information campaign to express the government’s aims and to affect the thought process of the population. This idea will be elaborated upon in the following section dealing with the importance of an information campaign in counterinsurgency.

²⁸ Thompson, 168.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid., 55.

³¹ Kitson, 53.

³² Ibid., 51.

³³ Kitson, 70.

³⁴ He suggests that “civilian measures, particularly in areas disputed by the insurgents, are a waste of time and money if they are unsupported by military operations to provide the necessary protection.” Thompson, 55.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Thompson, 52, 55;

³⁷ Mockaitis even points to civil-military cooperation as one of the three broad principles most important in British counterinsurgency. See, Mockaitis, *Peace Support Operations*, 133-34. The other two principles are minimum force and tactical flexibility. Each is discussed below.

³⁸ Ibid. See not 45 above.

³⁹ Ibid., 136. The Malayan campaign is a good example. In that campaign the British utilized a system coordinating action at three levels within the country; at the district, state and national levels.

⁴⁰ He states that the local committees are there “to ensure greater coordination in the execution of policy by reaching agreement on how it should be implemented in the particular area for which the committee is responsible.” Thompson, 83.

⁴¹ Thompson and Kitson both note and support the use of a Director of Operations to facilitate overall coordination. See, Thompson, 83 ; Kitson, 57.

⁴² Mockaitis, 136.

⁴³ This is noted by Thompson, 83.

⁴⁴ See Kitson, 55, 60.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 60.

⁴⁶ He states that “it is unlikely that the actual operations which it [the military force] subsequently carried out would be of much value unless the various contingents had some common understanding of the military problems concerned in fighting insurgents.” Ibid., 60.

⁴⁷ Mockaitis, *Peace Operations*, 133.

⁴⁸ *Duties in Aid to the Civil Power*, 3, quoted in Mockaitis, *Peace Operations*, 133. Mockaitis notes that this principle is elaborated in “virtually every pamphlet on counterinsurgency or civil unrest in the twentieth century.”

⁴⁹ Quoted in Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency in the post-imperial era* (New York: Manchester UP, 1995), 135.

⁵⁰ Mockaitis discusses the instrumental nature of minimum force compared to the more reactive nature of self-defence common to peacekeeping operations, *Peace Operations*, 133.

⁵¹ Kitson, 84-85.

⁵² Kitson, 87.

⁵³ Ibid., 87.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 90.

⁵⁵ Kitson, 91. Kitson is not particularly clear in explaining this “element of bluff.” It appears that he is suggesting that, within a framework of minimum force, it may not be the case that the force would be likely to

utilize high levels of force in many situations. Thus, he suggests that “one of the most difficult tasks facing a military commander is to get the maximum value out of it [the reputation] without having the bluff called.” Ibid., 91. Obviously having the bluff called would result in the loss of the reputation that had been fostered previously.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 199.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Kitson, 95.

⁶⁰ Thompson, 84.

⁶¹ Kitson, 95.

⁶² Background information encompasses information on broader social, political, and economic factors in addition to direct intelligence on the activities of insurgent forces. The scenario Kitson outlines makes this clear. In the scenario the commander of the army contingent collects information ranging from personal information of the villagers in his area of operations, to information related to businesses in the area and the local government. See, Kitson, 102-114.

⁶³ Ibid., 97-98.

⁶⁴ This increases the importance of continuity of forces in a particular area, as contacts established with other agencies and actors as well as the population could be lost if continuity is not maintained. Kitson recognizes that short-deployment times are a problem in that they encourage turnover which can threaten the intelligence gathering and analysis framework he proposes, 130.

⁶⁵ Kitson is adamant that a random approach to the conduct of operations is less efficient and offers less prospects of success in rooting out the insurgents and the underlying structure of their organization. Ibid., 98

⁶⁶ The importance of effective operations early in the campaign is not lost on Kitson, who recognizes that “if the government is able to develop its full potential quickly and mount effective operations in the early stages of the uprising it has a chance of cutting years off the time for concluding the business successfully or avoiding defeat.” Ibid., 190. Kitson also points to the critical importance the early stages of the campaign elsewhere noting that the foundations that are laid in the initial stages will “either promote or bedevil all that follows,” 81.

⁶⁷ Kitson, 97.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 80.

⁶⁹ Thompson, 89.

⁷⁰ Kitson, 77-78.

⁷¹ Thompson, 96.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Thompson elaborates on the danger of swaying from the truth. He suggests that “one government information officer that prevaricated with the truth will, if the truth subsequently becomes apparent, undo the good work of hundreds of other officers, because the very simplest peasant is capable of drawing the conclusion that the government which such an officer represents lacks faith in its own cause,” 96.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 98.

⁷⁵ Thompson, 144.

⁷⁶ Kitson, 79.

⁷⁷ Kitson, explains that the Malayan campaign was adversely affected by the lack of an effective information operations capability early in the campaign “when it was so sorely needed,” 79.

⁷⁸ Mockaitis, *Peace Operations*, 134.

⁷⁹ Thomson points to three virtues, patience, determination and offensive spirit, 171. Kitson also places emphasis on the importance of the government making its determination to win clear.

⁸⁰ Thompson, 58.

⁸¹ Thompson, 58.

⁸² Kitson suggests this is what happened with disastrous effects in Aden in 1966 when Britain announced its forces would withdraw in 1968 following independence. Kitson notes how this undermined all faith in an eventual government victory and how security forces from that point received little public support. See, Kitson, 50.

⁸³ Mockaitis, *Peace Operations*, xi.

⁸⁴ Such crises have been termed Complex Political Emergencies, CPEs. The current British Peace Operations doctrine *Joint Warfare Publication 3.01*, recognizes these types of conflict are the primary context of contemporary peace operations. See, Woodhouse, 31. Mockaitis also notes that the context of post-Cold War grey area operations is within the “failed states” of the contemporary period. Mockaitis, *Peace Operations*, 5.

⁸⁵ The following paragraph relies upon the similarities between the two forms of activity highlighted by Mockaitis, *Peace Operations*, 128-29. See also the discussion of operational challenges in contemporary peace operations in Sens, 36-37.

⁸⁶ Sens notes that belligerents in contemporary peace operations will not “operate according to traditional western modes of conventional combat but will pursue insurgency tactics designed to neutralize their technological and firepower disadvantages.” See, Sens, 37.

⁸⁷ This would apply predominantly to the belligerent parties and not to the intervening forces. Sens notes that this is an trend common to warfare in the post-World War Two period (thus including the insurgency wars where the British were involved) whereby the distinction between soldier and civilian and combatants and non-combatants has broken down “with the civilian population playing an increasing role in the political and military strategies of warring factions.” See, Sens, 26.

⁸⁸ He notes that “interventions will take place in ‘complex human environments’, as control of the population is often a key objective.” See, Sens, 36. Lovelock supports this similarity as he notes “the complex situation and the predominantly human dimension lead to strong similarities between the operational concepts and responses.” Lovelock, 70.

⁸⁹ Jakobsen, 41-42.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Kitson, 199.

⁹² Michael J. Dziedzic and Benjamin Lovelock, “An evolved “Post-Conflict” Role for the Military: Providing a Secure Environment and Supporting the Rule of Law,” in *Post Conflict Justice*, ed. M. Cherif Bassiouni (Ardsley NY: Transnational, 2002): 854.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ This is most clearly reflected in the current US doctrinal statement on peace operations which states that, “settlement not victory, is the ultimate measure of success, though settlement will rarely be achievable through military efforts alone. Peace Operations are conducted to reach a resolution by conciliation among the competing groups rather than termination by force... [They are] designed to create or sustain the conditions in which political and diplomatic activities may be conducted.” See, US Joint Warfare Center, *Joint Task Force Commanders Handbook for Peace Operations*, 16 June 1997, para 1-7 quoted in Dziedzic and Lovelock, 854.

⁹⁵ These three areas are noted by Jakobsen, 42.

⁹⁷ These recommendations apply generically to peace operations whether they are conducted under UN control or through a coalition of willing states or regional organization.

⁹⁸ Ingrid A. Lehman has performed some commendable research into this area of peace operations. She emphasizes the critical role information operations play in these types of operations. She urges that “field missions must have integral information programs,” and suggests “these must be installed from the outset in the basic structure of the mission,” warning that “Eleventh-hour improvisations and add-ons, no matter how brilliant, run just too many risks of being, at the least, too little and too late. At the worst the mission may be speechless and impotent.” She also reinforces the need for information operations in the more volatile and complex environment faced recently: “In the new peacekeeping environment of civil and ethnic wars, where hate propaganda is increasingly used as a weapon by the belligerents, ignoring the impact of this information tool is no longer an option.” See, Ingrid A. Lehman, *Peacekeeping and Public Information: Caught in the Crossfire* (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 152-53.

⁹⁹ The need for rapid-deployment of an information operations capability has been recognized in the Brahimi report. Recommendation 12 specifies the need for a “rapidly deployable capacity for public information.” See United Nations, *UN Panel Report on Peace Operations*, 56.

¹⁰⁰ Much recent scholarship has stressed the need for intelligence gathering in peace operations. See for example, Sens, 41; Paul Johnston, “No Cloak and Dagger Required: Intelligence Support to UN

Peacekeeping,” *Intelligence and National Security* 12, no. 4 (October 1997): 102-113; A. Walter Dorn, “The Cloak and the Blue Beret: The limits of Intelligence-Gathering in UN Peacekeeping,” in *Intelligence and Peacekeeping* (Clementsport, NS: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1999): 1-33; David A. Charters, “Out of the Closet: Intelligence Support for UN Peacekeeping,” in *Intelligence and Peacekeeping* (Clementsport, NS: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1999): 34-69. Charters in particular, connects the increasing need for intelligence support in peacekeeping operations to the more complex and volatile environment characteristic of post-Cold War peace operations. He suggests that “this new operational environment and the roles and missions that flow from it require the integration of intelligence into all aspects of planning and operations.” He also echoes Rundner’s assertion, noted in the following note, that the approaches framed for operation in mid-high intensity combat operations are not wholly appropriate to the environment characteristic to these operations. Thus, he suggests that “the most relevant approaches may be found in LIC [low-intensity conflict, essentially another name for insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare] concepts.” See, Charters, 41. Thus, Charters within an intelligence discussion, reinforces the validity of the argument made in this paper, that concepts initially developed for use in a counterinsurgency context may apply in the context of contemporary peace operations.

¹⁰¹ Martin Rudner suggests that intelligence operations in peace support operations “require Information and Intelligence capabilities that can differ from those of traditional conflict situations.” Such operations are both more complex and ambiguous than traditional conflict situations for which military intelligence and information systems were designed. This requires a more balanced application of all intelligence capabilities, especially the application of HUMINT, human intelligence sources, and the integration of military sources with those of other actors within the conflict zone including the local authorities and nongovernmental organizations. Rudner also suggests that assessment of that intelligence must take a “wide view” and incorporate wider political, social and economic factors, in addition to military concerns. This analysis largely corroborates Kitson’s conclusions stressing the need for intelligence collection from numerous sources, and an ongoing process of analysis to turn general background information, which ranges from military to non-military, political, social, and economic factors, into the requisite contact information. See, Martin Runder, “The Future of Canada’s Defence Intelligence,” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 15, no. 4 (Winter 2002-2003): 551-552.

¹⁰² The need for some form of organization is implied by Edward Flint who notes that, “one of the problems facing any response to a complex emergency is that of gathering pertinent information... Information gathered by both military and civilian organizations when fused, will contribute, potentially, toward the formulation of a more coherent response. It is surprising therefore that such information exchanges are at best patchy and... there is a need for further developments to overcome the rather ad hoc nature of existing relationships.” See, Edward Flint, “Civil Affairs: Soldiers Building Bridges,” in *Aspects of Peacekeeping*, ed. D.S. Gordon and F.H. Toase (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 244-245.

¹⁰³ The Brahimi report has made the recommendation that such quick impact projects be incorporated. It is not clear that it was intended to affect the population’s provision of intelligence information, although the link in this regard seems logical, especially in light of the focus upon popular support made in the counterinsurgency literature.

¹⁰⁴ On the CIMIC experience in Bosnia see, J. W. Rollins, “Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) in Crises Response Operations: The Implications for NATO,” *International Peacekeeping* 8, no. 8 (Spring 2001): 122-29. Rollins notes specifically that coordination with civil agencies and NGO’s is lacking at the “middle management level,” and that ensuring actions taken are coordinated with an overall plan, 127-28; On the issue of civil-military coordination in Kosovo see, John G. Cockell, “Civil-Military Responses to Security Challenges in Peace Operations: Ten Lessons From Kosovo,” *Global Governance* 8, (2002): 483-502.

¹⁰⁵ Lovelock notes that committees similar to those utilized by Britain in a counterinsurgency context are currently being utilized in Kosovo, suggesting that this lesson is already being learned. See, Lovelock, 70.

¹⁰⁶ These recommendations are similar to those drawn from the Kosovo experience dealing with unity of planning and coordination at the strategic level by Cockell. See, Cockell., 497. The United Nations has developed an integrated mission task force concept that would bring together the many departments in the UN Secretariat involved in some aspect of the mission at the planning stage and would assist mission management. See the Comments by Canadian Ambassador Colin Granderson, “The Brahimi Report and the Future of

Peacekeeping,” in *Future Peacekeeping: A Canadian Perspective*, ed. David Rudd, Jim Hanson and Adam Stinson (Toronto: CISS, 2001): 5-15.

¹⁰⁷ This has been suggested recently, independent of any recognition of the influence of British counterinsurgency doctrine, by Manwaring and Corr. They suggest that contemporary security “is at its base a governance issue” noting that a primary threat in the contemporary security environment is illegitimate governance. See, Max G. Manwaring and Edwin G. Corr, “Defense and Offence in Peace and Stability Operations,” in *Beyond Delcaring Victory and Coming Home: The Challenges of Peace and Stability Operations*, eds. Max G. Manwaring and Anthony James Jones (Westport CT: Praeger, 2000), 35;

¹⁰⁸ Lovelock suggests that current practice, particularly in Kosovo, has moved beyond current doctrine, necessitating its further development. See, Lovelock, 68.

¹⁰⁹ Thompson, 171.

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